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ABSTRACT 
From 2006 plans were implemented to create a deep-sea water port linked to 
an Economic Zone in the  coastal Province of Ha Tinh, located in north 
central Vietnam. The multi-purpose Zone entitled ‘Vung Ang’, was to attract 
foreign investors, while the port would provide a link to nearby Laos and 
Thailand. The project obviously had large implications for the administrations 
at various levels of governance from Hanoi to the coastal communes and 
villages, but even more serious impacts on the people living in the affected 
areas. A large area of about 23,000 hectares was to be cleared, affecting the 
people of 9 communes, in some of which all inhabitants had to leave their 
houses and homesteads, to be relocated to completely new settlements about 
10 miles inland. These tightly knit communities were not too happy with the 
prospect to leave their homes and land, the burial places of their ancestors, and 
the long term comforts of community support networks. While initial decision 
making process started at the highest levels of Vietnam Governance, the 
implementation of port and industrial park construction and the related 
relocation policy was delegated to Ha Tinh province, which is consistent with 
current decentralisation policies in Vietnam. Actual implementation was carried 
out by the affected District and Commune level officials – with support from 
the Communist Party led Mass Organisations – who were in charge of the 
planning and implementation of the relocation process. This entailed a 
complex and sensitive series of steps to inform affected households, prepare 
relocation areas and allocate compensation and alternative housing. This paper 
describes the implementation dynamics of relocation by depicting and 
assessing the roles of all stakeholders involved, including the impacts - for 
better or for worse – of the relocated households. It brings out the way local 
authorities dealt with affected people, including efforts linked to the ideal of 
grass-roots democracy. Key areas of contestation are uncovered, such as 
inadequate infrastructure and low compensation rates. The paper has a second 
objective to assess the degree to which decentralisation in Vietnam has been 
actually implemented, and how this affects policy making processes such as the 
Vung Ang port/industrial zone project. The paper concludes that the 
relocation policy was implemented in a fairly efficient and harmonious way – 
with a very intensive engagement of the entire provincial administrative 
machinery, but that it is too early to assess the livelihood opportunities of the 
relocated households. 
Keywords 
Vietnam, decentralisation, land acquisition and compensation policy, 
livelihoods. 
6 
 
Assessing decentralised policy implementation in 
Vietnam1 
The case of land recovery and resettlement in the Vung Ang 
economic zone 
1 Introduction 
In 2006, a decision was taken at the highest levels of Vietnam governance to 
construct a deep-sea water port linked to an Economic Zone or Industrial Park 
in the coastal district of Ky An, in the north-central Province of Ha Tinh 
(annex 1). The grand vision for the multi-purpose Zone entitled ‘Vung Ang’, 
was stated to attract a large number of (large) foreign investors, and that the 
port would be linked by road to relatively nearby Laos, supporting industrial 
development there and fostering trade and friendship between the country and 
Vietnam (JDI, 2010). This decision obviously had large implications for the 
administrations at various levels of governance right from Hanoi to the coastal 
communes and villages, but even more serious impacts on the people living in 
the affected areas. A large area of about 23,000 hectares was earmarked and 
was to be cleared, affecting the people  of 9 communes in the affected district 
of Ky Anh, including the two communes of Ky Phuong and Ky Loi, where all 
inhabitants had to leave their houses and homesteads, to be relocated to 
completely new settlements about 10 miles inland. Unsurprisingly, these mostly 
tightly knit communities were unhappy with the prospect to leave their homes 
and land, the burial places of their ancestors, and the long term comforts of 
community support networks.  
While the initial planning and decision making process started at the 
highest levels of Vietnam Governance, the implementation of port and 
industrial park construction and the related relocation policy was delegated to 
Ha Tinh province. This is conform the current decentralisation  policy of 
Vietnam, under which considerable powers are delegated to the Provincial 
People Committees (PPC) (GoV, 2005; FForde, 2003). A special Agency was 
created in the form of the Vung Ang Management Unit, which was to report 
to the Ha Tinh Provincial People Committee (PPC), and in charge of all 
planning and construction activities.  It was under some pressure to work fast, 
as contracts were signed soon with a foreign investor, the Korea based 
Formosa Group Company. A large role was reserved for the affected District 
and Commune level officials of Ha Tinh Province, which constitute the two 
                                                
1 This paper is based on research carried out in Ha Tinh Province as part of the 
project ‘Capacity Development for Integrated and Evidence Based Policy Research’ 
which was jointly implemented from 2009-2011 by the Ho Chi Minh National 
Academy for Politics and Public Administration and ISS. It was funded by the Royal 
Netherlands Embassy in Hanoi, which generous support is gratefully acknowledged. 
We are also grateful to the people and officials of the Ky Phuong and Ky Loi 
Communes as well as the officials of Ha Tinh Province, Ky Anh District, the Vung 
Ang Management Unit and members of local Mass Organisation units. 
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formal administrative levels below a Vietnamese Province. They were in charge 
of the planning and implementation of the relocation process, entailing a 
complex and sensitive series of steps to inform the affected households, to 
prepare relocation areas including infrastructure, facilities like schools and bus 
stops, to arrange the compensation for affected households keeping with the 
relevant laws and decrees, and to physically move households either to 
completed new houses or temporary shelter. In this process they were assisted 
by the so called Mass Organisations, which are nation-wide state-society 
organisations led by the Vietnamese Communist Party, which organise specific 
professional or other identity groups, so that there is a Farmer Union, a 
Women, and a Youth Union, but there is also the largest Fatherland Front 
which can be seen as some kind of huge umbrella organisation.  
This paper aims to describe the implementation process of relocation by 
depicting and assessing the roles of all stakeholders involved, including the 
various levels of provincial administration, the Vung Ang Management Unit, 
the mass organisations, and – last but not least  – the people who were 
relocated to a relocation area – for better or for worse. It considers the process 
in terms of a multi-stakeholder governance process, where stronger and 
weaker, public and private actors and groups are actively engaged, both in 
formal and informal ways (Hyden and Court, 2004).  
However, this paper has a second objective to assess the degree to which 
decentralisation in Vietnam has been actually implemented, and how it affects 
policy making processes such as the Vung Ang port/industrial zone project. As 
per a series of laws and decrees (de Wit, 2007:5) Vietnam is implementing a 
process of delegating powers from the Ministries in the capital Hanoi to 
provincial, district and commune levels, and the Government itself claims, that: 
‘by 2005, new regulations on Central-local decentralisation and decentralisation 
among local governments will have been completed and implemented which 
will improve the competence and accountability of local governments’ (ibid: 
26). However, there is no overall agreement as to whether this is the case, with 
several sources claiming that there has been delegation of tasks to the 
provinces, but only in a very limited extent beyond the province to the districts 
and communes (Fritzen, 2002, World Bank, 2004, FForde, 2003). All agree that 
the type of decentralisation prevalent in Vietnam is not the more ambitious 
type where tasks and funds (or independent taxing powers) are delegated to 
newly formed elected councils and which is also known as democratic 
decentralisation or devolution. Rather, decentralisation in Vietnam is best seen as 
deconcentration, where powers remain at central levels, but where tasks (only) are 
being delegated to lower levels of administration (Turner and Hulme, 1997). 
This paper will assess to what extent such claims can be substantiated. The 
broader aim of this paper is then to consider the administrative dimensions of 
policy making and implementation at the various levels of administration 
which, in Vietnam, include the Central ministries in Hanoi, the Province, the 
District, the Commune and to some extent the Thon (or village level with the 
village leader). Taking such a perspective, it aims to bring out the specific 
responsibilities, capacities and degree of autonomy at these various levels, 
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which may be changing due to the on-going decentralisation reforms. It will 
also make it possible to assess the scope of citizens such as farmers affected by 
relocation to participate in policy planning and implementation - and here too 
there may be changes as a result of recent decrees relating to grass-roots 
democracy (Duc et.al., 2008). 
This paper finally aims to contribute to the growing literature and 
evidence as regards the impacts of relocation or resettlement on people due to 
land recovery or land requisition. This may happen in urban areas as a result of 
slum clearance, in the urban fringe due to large housing projects and anywhere 
where states and cities are industrialising – and look for land to build factories, 
power plans, dams etc. It is obvious that such relocation deeply affects people, 
and assumedly the poor more negatively than richer groups. It always affects 
their livelihoods – the scope to apply human capital as in labour force, physical 
capital as farmland and (free) natural resources, social capital as in community 
support systems  and political capital as in access to politicians and dwell 
connected brokers or mediators. In view of this, the leading key question of 
this paper is: What is the role of the various levels of administration in the implementation 
of resettlement planning in the Vung Ang Economic Zone of  Ha Tinh province, and there 
will be attention for the following sub questions: 
• What is the background and nature of the resettlement policy, especially 
relating to land acquisition, compensation and community consultation?  
• How is the implementation framework of the resettlement planning 
process; what are the responsibilities and (expected) resources at the level 
of province, district, commune levels and how is coordination organised? 
• Who are the stakeholders in this policy at the various levels, including the 
People Committees, People Councils, land owners and farmers, industries 
and companies? 
• Are households and communities consulted on resettlement plans, if yes, 
what is the nature of such consultation and do people have a voice in 
planning? 
• What are the general outcomes of the resettlement planning policy in view 
of its objectives, as well as in terms of impacts on farmers, employment 
and social, legal and political factors? 
This text is the outcome of intensive research in mid-2010, based on a mix of 
primary and secondary, qualitative and quantitative data obtained by a multi-
disciplinary 9 member research team, most of whom are working in the 
Institutes of State and Law, Economics, Sociology and Political Science of the 
Ho Chi Minh Academy of Politics and Public Administration  (HCMA). One 
team member is from the International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus 
University ISS. The study was part of the project ‘Capacity Development for 
Integrated and Evidence Based Policy Research’ which was jointly 
implemented from 2009-2011 by HCMA and ISS. It was funded by the Royal 
Netherlands Embassy in Hanoi, which generous support is gratefully 
acknowledged. Primary data were collected during field work on location in Ha 
Tinh Province and Ky Anh District. Qualitative and quantitative methods were 
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applied, including open and structured interviews, focus group discussions, 
participatory observation, as well as a household survey (N=70). In addition, 
secondary data were collected and analysed including local planning reports, 
provincial level statistics, and relevant policy documents.     
2   Analytical perspectives 
In view of the paper topics four broad sets of analytical and general 
perspectives have guided and informed this paper: perspectives of the 
interactive policy process, with its emphasis on the role of weak(er) and 
strong(er) stakeholders who participate in the policy process seen as an arena; 
perspectives on decentralisation; on capacity, as the potential of 
decentralisation critically relates to capacity in terms of human resources but 
also the nature of organisations and institutional frameworks, and finally 
perspectives of livelihood, to better understand the changes in general 
household (and especially farmer) livelihoods before and after relocation. We 
shall briefly introduce these perspectives here.  
2.1 The interactive policy process 
While there are many different definitions of policy, we understand policy as a 
process: a long term activity starting with issues, moving through objective-
setting to implementation and evaluation  (Turner and Hulme, 1997). Several 
distinct phases of the policy process can be distinguished, even while these may 
not be so clear-cut in practice. There is first the stage of policy initiation or 
agenda setting. If it is decided that a policy will be needed, there is the stage of 
policy formulation and design: planning and designing a proposal with 
objectives, a time schedule, a budget and other (human) resources needed - 
ideally anticipating problems to be expected and fixing indicators to measure 
policy outcomes. Based on this, decision makers come to the policy decision, 
while sometimes adjustments are made. Policy implementation is subsequently 
the most complex phase to get to work in the field (or the policy arena) with 
the ‘target groups’ and other stakeholders, and it is here that the perspective of 
the ‘interactive policy process’ is most visible. Finally, and ideally, the policy is 
monitored at each policy stage, and there should be a solid end-evaluation, 
linking policy objectives to outcomes but also impacts. This above schedule of 
stages may give the wrong impression of a rather natural and smooth policy 
process (what is also termed ‘the linear perspective’), but in reality it is rather 
messy, complex, hard to manage and in fact rather unpredictable process. 
Generally – perhaps most clearly visible in developing countries, a large 
portion of individual and collective demand making, the representation of 
interests, and the emergence and resolution of conflict occur in the  
implementation stage (not at policy-making stage) (Grindle and Thomas, 1989; 
Turner and Hulme, 1997). Politics, based on factions, informal patron-client 
ties, and other individual or group interests – is used for personal/group 
demands on the bureaucracy for the allocation of goods and services. This 
10 
 
implies that most attention is needed for the implementation process 
(including winners and losers, champions/change agents, and the role of the 
elites) – and delays, returns, changes, adjustments – making policy outcomes 
rather unpredictable. Officials may be transparent and openly publish policy 
plans and budgets, but they may also have a stake to keep things more secret 
which makes corruption – the private use of public funds or opportunities - 
easier. The implementation of policy is hence an interactive and complicated 
process because many stakeholders are involved: weak(er) and strong(er) ones. 
In order to design a successful policy, identifying all possible stakeholders in 
the policy arena is important. Stakeholder analysis helps policy makers and 
planners to identify a variety of different groups that are likely to affected 
(adversely or positively) by a project/intervention, or which  may  have been 
overlooked, but who may still play an important role in what is best termed 
‘the policy arena’.  
Finally, it is important to note that policy processes come in very diverse 
forms and shapes: they may occur as ‘muddling through’ where ill-defined 
policies are implemented poorly by being affected by mismanagement and 
indifference, or they can be clear policy as in a decree or decision that is 
implemented in a top-down fashion through a ministry or municipality. It is 
generally held that effective mixes of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ policy 
strategies are most effective, were citizens can participate in policy formulation, 
play a supporting or monitoring role, linking with the officials to make policies 
effective in terms of bridging the gaps between what people need and what the 
policy provides (Botes et.al, 2000). Such processes are more likely where ‘the 
state is close to the people’, i.e. in a context where decentralization in its 
ambitious form of devolution is successful. Participation has lots of potential 
in terms of both efficiency and possible empowering impacts. However, there 
are many different types, and it could even take the shape of manipulation, 
where policy makers act as if consultation occurs, but where people’s views are 
not actually taken seriously. Scholars such as Hicky and Mohan (2005) are 
suspicious of the proliferation of ‘participation toolbox approaches’, but 
support participation if it leads to real (and positive, welfare driven) 
transformation. They take position against situations of participation as 
negative or 'non-participation', where participation is contrived as the 
opportunity to indoctrinate. Other more helpful forms are when stake holders 
are informed, or, more ambitiously, where there is consensus-building: 
stakeholders interact, and analyse problems and solutions of project together. 
Ideal forms include partnerships (exchange among equals working towards a 
mutual goal) or self-management, for example where communities are 
providing funds to build their own community hall. A recent addition to the 
participation discourses is the concept of ‘spaces’ (Gaventa, 2005) where for 
example ‘invited spaces are arenas, forums or simply community-official 
meetings, created by the authorities to allow consultation or to listen and learn 
from people’s voices. Closed spaces are those arenas of power where the 
powerful (officials, politicians, private sector bosses) take unilateral decisions, 
without consultation of others or accountability mechanisms.  
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2.2 Decentralization 
Decentralisation is and has been seen as an important strategy to improve 
governance, to bring governance closer to the people. However, 
decentralisation is a very ambitious and broad governance reform, affecting all 
(and even creating new) levels of government, and multiplying the number of 
stakeholders in governance. This varies however as per the type of 
decentralisation but it is certainly the case of ‘devolution’ or democratic 
decentralisation with its professed ideal of establishing local democracy and 
participation, and where a central or provincial government delegates both 
tasks/responsibilities, as well as powers and funds to lower levels of 
administration. Other, less ambitious forms include deconcentration (or 
administrative decentralisation), which is the most common type, and where 
only responsibilities and tasks are delegated (to field offices) along with the 
earmarked funds, but where all powers and decisions on policy and budgets 
remain centralised. Another form is delegation, which is similar to 
deconcentration in that decision making powers and budget control remain 
with the centre/central agency, but where specific and specialised tasks are 
delegated to a newly created government agency - and where such agencies 
have considerable autonomy within clearly indicated boundaries (as in the 
Vung Ang Management Unit in our case). Examples could be the National 
Airport Authority or Metropolitan Development Authorities in many mega-
cities; often a minister is the chairperson (Turner and Hulme, 1997; World 
Bank: 2005).  
The most interesting type then is devolution, or democratic decentralisation 
which also entails the creation or empowerment of elected local bodies, such as 
village boards or municipal councils. In that case decentralisation offers 
potential benefits in terms of improved local level planning and 
implementation through enhanced local consultation and participation, 
enhanced local democracy and responsiveness (Blair, 2000). Other potential 
benefits are that it may increase government sensitivity to people’s conditions 
and needs, that a larger number of people is reached, that it reduces 
administrative pressure on central bureaucracies, and that it leads to a stronger 
role for local government which is a key institution between people and the 
central state. However, it must be emphasised however that any form of 
decentralisation is an inherent political process, in that is represents a transfer 
of tasks and funds, hence of power. It always means a gain for some and a loss 
for others. Important factors which may help make decentralisation successful 
include that the centre retains a strong rule setting & monitoring role, and that 
there is sustained political will with central politicians and senior bureaucrats, 
that there is a careful selection as to what to decentralize and what to keep in 
central hands, and that there is sufficient (administrative) capacity at the 
(lower) local level, as well as proper legal and financial frameworks. Factors 
which have proven to be also helpful include proper systems of accountability 
and transparency, (some experience with) a functioning democracy, general 
public awareness and literacy, a strong and active civil society, and popular 
pressure from below and proper frameworks to enable public participation. 
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2.3 Capacity  
This paper applies a broad, holistic definition of capacity, as framed for 
example by Grindle and Hilderbrand (1995; see also Listhaus et.al. 1999). They 
define capacity as:  the ability to perform appropriate tasks effectively, 
efficiently and sustainably.  Their conception of capacity includes five 
dimensions: (1) the action environment includes the wider context in which an 
organization functions, which includes economic factors (growth, labour 
market), political factors (leadership support, stability, legitimacy) and social 
factors (overall human resource development incl. literacy, class structure, civil 
society); (2) the public sector institutional context consists of concurrent 
policies, public service rules and regulations, budgetary support, role of the 
state, management practices, and formal and informal power relations; (3) the 
task network refers to “the set of organizations involved in accomplishing any 
given task”; (4) organizations “are the building blocks of the task network and 
the vantage point from which diagnostic research is usually carried out”.  
Studying an organization’s capacity, factors such as goals, structure of work, 
incentive systems, management, physical resources, formal and informal 
communications, behavioural norms, and technical assistance are important; 
(5) human resources includes aspects such as the (nature of the) recruitment of 
staff, their (over or under- utilization, training and retention. (quotes from 
Grindle and Hilderbrand, 1995: 445-447). For our study, such a broad capacity 
framework informs the need to consider for example not only whether officials 
in a District are capable, but also whether they are motivated through adequate 
incentives, and/or through the good example of the Head of the Organisation 
who may show appreciation to well performing staff. Grindle and Hildebrant 
(ibid.) believe that the organisational culture (norms and values, routines, the 
way things are done, gender norms) is a very important dimension of an 
organisation: it may be more important that staff feel motivated and 
appreciated than that they have computers or high salaries.  
2.4 Livelihoods, agency and the moral economy of people 
A final analytical perspective may help to understand grassroots or household 
dimensions of our research theme. Such a more bottom-up focused 
perspective includes Livelihoods approaches, which entail perspectives of people 
oriented/ actor/agency focused action (e.g. Rakodi, 1999; Scott (2003) applies 
these to gender studies in Vietnam). These are especially relevant while 
addressing the conditions of the poor and vulnerable, and for understanding 
the scope for empowering the poor and marginalised to build on their own 
opportunities, supporting their access to assets, and developing an enabling 
and supportive institutional environment. Livelihoods approaches aim to aid 
analysis of the factors affecting peoples’ livelihoods, including their access to 
social, political, human, physical, financial and natural capitals as well as their 
ability to put these to productive use. The approaches imply attention for the 
different strategies households (but also the different male and female 
members of households) apply (and how they use their assets) in pursuit of 
their priorities. Livelihood approaches take into account the vulnerability of 
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people, and the way they cope with crises and stress events. In the context of 
the present study, loss of land clearly amounts to a clear stress event, while 
those cases where land is recovered and people are resettled can be seen as 
traumatic - as it may lead to the loss of several capitals - both physical (land, 
water, trees etc), social capital as in community support, and human capital 
where a farmer may suddenly have no choice but to do lowly paid wage labour. 
For the present study the loss of financial capital is extremely important: not 
only the amount of compensation but also the capacity of a farmer household 
to put that money to good use, so that the household can keep up wellbeing 
into the future. Finally, resettlement may reduce access to political capital 
where a farmer may lose important personal relations with local politicians, 
leaders of mass organisations or mediators (Mattingly,  (2009).  
3   The context of  multi-level governance in a changing 
Vietnam 
3.1 A changing Vietnam 
The International Development Association (IDA), a part of the World Bank, 
argues that “Vietnam is one of the fastest growing economies in the world…  
It has the potential to be one of the great success stories in development.”  
Real incomes in Vietnam have grown 7.2 percent per year over the last 10 
years, from US$170 in 1993 to GDP per capita of more than $1,000 in 2008.  
The poverty rate has fallen from 58% in 1993 to 15.9 percent in 2007, and 
IDA is confident that “Vietnam can reach most of the Millennium Goals.” 
(World Bank, 2009:1) According to the World Bank, before 1993 private 
enterprises were negligible, while: “now account for two-thirds of the 
investments made each year.”  While the private sector is growing rapidly, the 
number of state-owned enterprises has been reduced by half (World Bank, 
2009:3).  Due to the rapid expansion of the private sector, both domestic and 
foreign-invested firms have connected solidly with global markets, and private 
firms now contribute nearly 80 percent of manufactured products and over 70 
percent of non-oil exports.  This process underlines the fact that Vietnam has 
become more and more an integral part of international product and 
distribution chains (ibid.:3). 
3.2 Vietnam: administrative structure and levels 
Vietnam is a socialist republic, and presently the administrative structure is 
marked by a clear hierarchy and a division into four levels: the central 
government in Hanoi, the provincial governments of the 64 Provinces, and 
below that level the district (about 600) and commune governments 
(approximately 11.000).  Each level has a People’s council (which is the 
representative branch which is elected, for example the National Assembly at 
Hanoi) and a People’s Committee (the executive). The council members are 
elected by the people of the area in question (for 5 years), but the next higher 
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level (say the Province for the District) has to approve the candidates to be 
elected for the council.  
At all levels, the People’s Committee has budgetary and administrative 
responsibilities. They are charged with maintaining law, order and security 
within their jurisdictions; they have to forward budget requests to higher levels; 
review and approve the plans for socioeconomic development within their 
delegated authority and execute the budget. As per the laws, the authority of 
decision making is the elected People’s Council with its elected representatives, 
but people’s councils as collectives are not always very powerful (see also 
Fforde, 2003: 24; Kerkvliet, 2004:7). In terms of administrative autonomy for 
local officials and departments, they have to report to both to the local 
people’s Committee and Council, as well as to the line department or line 
ministries as regards the sector in which they work at higher levels (Fforde, 
2003:12). Generally, each Council is accountable to the next higher level in the 
three level structure of sub national government, and the province is upwardly 
accountable to the central government. All administrative levels go through an 
annual planning cycle, where for example the district makes a plan which is 
submitted to the province. The plan is drafted by officials of the People’s 
Committee, and approved by the People’s Council of the administrative level 
concerned.  
A final more geographical than administrative unit is the village or Thon, 
which has no administrative functions. Yet there are reports that the village 
(thon) as a political entity and the position of the Head of the Thon may be 
important in many provinces (Pham Quang Minh, 2004:99): ‘the village head is 
most likely to have direct contact with the villagers. Though their roles are 
important, their privileges are modest in comparison to commune cadres. They 
are not trained, have no social and health insurance and are given only about 
100.000 VND per month allowance’ (One US $ is 21.000 VND; one € = VND 
25.000). There are indications that the Village Head Men (and they may also be 
Head Women) are important, as can be seen from the fact that under the 
Grass Roots democracy decree they need to be elected by the Thon villagers 
(Duc et.al. 2008).  
3.3 Decentralisation? 
Many academics and Vietnam observers agree that too much centralisation is 
‘incompatible with the market economy that has replaced the centrally planned 
one’ (Kerkvliet, 2004:15). However, most observers also agree that in reality 
there is relatively little decentralisation in Vietnam in general, even while there 
are considerable differences across provinces, and even districts across the 
country (Fritzen, 2002; Fforde, 2003). As already mentioned, most observers 
agree that the type of decentralisation that occurs is deconcentration at most 
(administrative decentralisation where decision making power remains 
centralised) rather than devolution (or democratic decentralisation where 
decision making power is decentralised to relatively autonomous elected sub-
national bodies cf. World Bank, 2005). Fritzen (ibid.:7) argues that devolution 
‘is not on the policy agenda in any clearly visible way’. The current 
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administrative system is only decentralised in a limited sense says Fforde  
(2003:24) and there is especially a lack of power for the commune and grass 
roots levels which mostly do not seem to participate yet in planning and 
implementation. 
All agree that an decentralisation started with the adoption of a new 
budget law in 1996, which was subsequently amended in 1998 (Fritzen, 2002: 
4; Duc Ho Vu, 2005). However, it may be noted that these laws only refer to 
fiscal decentralisation at the level of the province: ‘the law did not mention 
spending responsibility and tax revenue for sub-national governments at 
district and commune levels. It was implicitly understood that the government 
at provincial level had to make all these related decisions’ (ibid.: 2005: 7). This 
may explain the present situation where the provinces may become (much) 
more powerful depending on leadership (and economic opportunities) but that 
this may not imply more powers for the districts and communes in such 
provinces.  Fritzen (2002) agrees by saying that the current set up leaves the 
system ‘centralized’ at the provincial level. Another law, adopted in 2001, 
relates to the vertical dimension of authority: the Revised Law on 
Governmental organisation (Fforde, 2003:13).  
In terms of fiscal decentralisation, Vietnam could be termed moderately 
decentralised in a formal way as spending by sub-national governments 
amounts to about 40- 44% of total government expenditures (Duc Ho Vo, 
2005: 15; World Bank 2004: 79 - where there is a reference to Vietnam as a 
‘highly decentralised country’). However, this does not mean that sub-national 
governments (SNG) also have powers to decide about this considerable ratio 
of finance. Indeed, here too it seems best to speak of decentralisation as in 
deconcentration, as SNGs have only limited discretion to decide on 
expenditures at their various levels, ‘in this case, the SNGs are only spending 
units’ (Duc Ho Vo, ibid). He (ibid.: 25) indicates that Vietnam does not have 
an explicit system of capital transfers; funds for capital investment are tailored 
in the equalisation transfer and are basically very limited. A report by the VN 
Ministry of Planning (VN Government, 2005: 94) mentions that investment 
funds for local infrastructure come from conditional grants under the 
equalisation grants (for example the school construction programme). The 
same source (ibid.:39) indicates that three rich Vietnamese provinces transfer 
large amounts of money to the central government, and that poor provinces 
indeed receive considerable amounts by way of transfers, but that this is mostly 
for re-current expenses. Where capital investment is concerned, it appears that 
it is rather the richest provinces (those with more industries and investment 
potential) which receive most funds (ibid: 40). Hence, distribution of State 
investments is termed ‘pro-growth’, rather than pro-poor.  
But perhaps the main thing to note is that financial relations between 
provinces and the national government are subject to negotiation, so that these 
can vary from case to case. This was communicated in our discussions in Ha 
Tinh province, but also indicated by Duc Ho Vo (ibid: ‘expenditure 
responsibilities are vaguely defined’). This relates to the fluidity of decision 
making, related to the importance of intra-party divisions and the importance 
of particularistic, informal relationships, as argued by Wescott (2003). It also 
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links to the observations by Malesky (2004: 287) who starts from the 
assumption that economic innovation (and the efforts to pull in foreign direct 
investment FDI- as is the case in Ha Tinh Province) at the provincial level is 
caused by four factors including regionalism, historical autonomy, culture and 
personal relations with key central actors (see also de Wit, 2011).   
3.4 Grassroots democracy 
In 1998 the Grassroots Democracy Resolution 29 (GDR) was adopted by the 
Vietnam Government, which was later amended in resolution 79 
(79/2003/ND-CP). The Resolution is designed to meet the following 
objectives, starting to be the initial legal foundation to attract the people’s 
participation in the planning process.  
• to promote self-control and creativeness of the people in communes, 
• create spiritual and physical motivations,  
• improve people’s livelihood,  
• increase intellectual standard,  
• prevent bureaucracy and corruption,  
• build a society with equality and civilisation, and  
• allow people to directly take part in discussions and decisions related to 
their practical needs. 
Another resolution 34, stipulates that plans be discussed with local 
communities, and that expenditures are disclosed to them. Basically, the GDR 
aims at the following: People have the right to be informed; the right to be 
consulted on decisions before the Commune authorities can adopt them; the 
right to inspect and supervise; and the right to decide directly. The GDR also 
stipulates that the Village Head must be freely and democratically elected 
(Duc/Ngo Huy Duc, 2008:2-3). 
4  The planning and present status of  the Vung Ang 
economic zone 
The agreement to establish a new deep sea port to be linked to a sea shore 
Industrial Zone to be named ‘Vũng Áng Economic Zone’ (VAEZ) in the Ky 
An District of Ha Tinh Province was established by the Decision No 
72/2006/QĐ-TT of Prime Minister dated April 3, 20062. The several 
objectives included firstly to exploit the natural advantages of the geographical 
position (next to the Vũng Áng and Sơn Dương deep-water ports, near the 
                                                
2 One official indicated during an interview that the VAEZ has a long history. The 
initiative initially came from the central administration in Hanoi and was formulated 
even before the Vietnam War. It only took on more concrete shape recently with the 
influx of foreign investors to Vietnam. The plan was then designed in Hanoi; the local 
administration is expected to implement it.  
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National Road No 1A and on the new National Road 12A linking to Laos and 
Thailand as well as near the Thạch Khê iron mine). It was also to promote the 
socio-economic development of Hà Tĩnh province, creating a cornerstone to 
take off in social and economic terms for the Northern Central Region, so 
linking development to other provinces of this Region- as well as to Laos and 
Cambodia, thereby narrowing the gap in economic development, and 
safeguarding the integration to national and global economies. The ambitious 
plans for VAEZ include many components as laid down in colourful 
brochures and maps. The facilities that were to be created on a priority basis 
included: to build the sea port, to develop and attract metallurgical industry 
using nearby available materials such as iron and titan; to attract and establish 
industries  exploiting the sea port; create general enabling conditions for 
imports into Laos and Thailand through the new road (JDI, 2010) ; and to 
attract industries support exports. Following Decision 72, the Government 
approved a detailed zoning plan, including an Industrial zone of 12,000 ha; the 
Vung Ang Port (12m. at its deepest, potential to handle ships of 50.000 tonnes; 
the Sơn Dương Port (40-50 mt depth, the deepest in Vietnam, can handle 
ships of 500,000 tonnes); the Long Liên Vương Resettlement Zone where 
housing will appear for port and EZ personnel; and a Service Zone. The total 
capital to be invested was estimated at US $ 15 billion. The plans for 
occupation of the VAEZ include an Oil Refinery Plant; a Vietnam – India 
Joint Venture Steel Plant; the Thạch Khê Steel Plant invested by TKV 
(Vinacomin) – total volume of steel will be 21 million of tones a year; the Vũng 
Áng 1 and Vũng Áng 2 Thermoelectricity Plants, capacity of 1200 MW each; 
and finally a Clean Water Plant supplying 12.000 m3 / day, to be expanded to 
30.000m3 in the future. In addition, the VAEZ is meant to become the basis 
for many processing industries. At the time of the field work in 2010, activities 
to realize the high priority plans were in full swing. A total area of 22,781 had 
been cleared, also those tracts where there 9 communes of Kỳ Anh district 
with a population of 15,000 people used to exist. We may already note that 
approximately 3,500 households had been affected, among them 2,200 
households of 5 communes which would need to be moved, and we will 
discuss the fate of some of them in the following chapters.  
At present, the EZ is growing fast with more than 90 licensed projects 
with a total registered capital of VND 240,000 billion.  In the future, it will 
become an industrial, commercial & service and tourist city that will perform 
dynamically and efficiently as a global centre in the region and the world. Two 
of 12 docks of the Vung Ang deep sea port were completed, while 8 of the 
planned 36 docks of the Sơn Dương Port were ready (with investment and 
exploitation by the Taiwanese to support their steel plant).  
 
VAEZ management 
A special Management Vehicle of Management Unit (MU) was created to 
establish and manage the Vung Ang EZ. It consists of 40 people. The Head of 
the Vung Ang MU (VAMU) at the time of our research was the Vice Chairman 
of Ha Tinh Provincial People Committee; three Vice Heads were appointed by 
the Chairman of the Provincial People Committee. That the Province itself 
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could lead the VAEZ project and appoint staff there was an outcome of the 
2008 Decision 29, relating to the decentralization of tasks to the provincial 
level. The VAMU has an Administrative Office, a Division of Natural resource 
and Environment, a Division of Businesses Management; a Division of 
Planning and Finance; a unit for Inspection. Besides, the VAMU has three 
specialised Centres: 1) The Centre for investment promotion; 2) The Centre 
for infrastructure services, and 3) the Centre for water supply. The MU has 2 
offices; one in Hà Tĩnh City, and the second one in Vũng Áng itself. All 
financial transactions take place in Office 1 of Ha Tinh. As per 2009, the 
amount of disbursement was VND 3,000 billion. It may be noted that the 
VAMU mandate is limited to functions of state management, it is not allowed 
to be engaged in (for profit) business. It is charged then to prepare the VAEZ 
for national and foreign investment and industrial activity; to actively attract 
such investors and to invite proposal from investors; to appraise these and to 
issue Investment Permission.  
The VAMU in turn contracted out specific tasks as regards planning, 
designing and constructing all the infrastructure, services and facilities as 
regards the resettlement areas for the displaced households to the one large 
contractor: the Xuân Thành Group. The relocation is about an area of 300 ha, 
which land was cleared by the Province as we will describe below, and handed 
over in stages to the Xuân Thành Group. The overall technical design of the 
VAEZ was made by the Hà Tĩnh Consulting and Construction Company. 
 
The main stages of project implementation of relocation can be listed as follows:  
1. The Province informs the District about the Project, including details 
of zoning and planning, and the District and Communes subsequently 
inform the affected people; 
2. Setting up landmarks for the boundaries of the project, keeping in 
mind the law, and drafting an implementation timetable; 
3. Setting up the Panel of Land Clearance; which Panel is to hold 
meetings with the affected local people about the project and its 
implications; This appears to be the same as the District Board of 
Compensation, Support and Resettlement (regulated by the 2003 Land 
Law), which prepares the plan of Compensation, Support and 
Resettlement (PCSR), which is approved by the District People 
Committee (DPC)    
4. The Panel in cooperation with Commune People Committee carries 
out the investigation into land and housing details, making a 
memorandum signed by households. 
5. The outcomes of the investigation are sent to the Commune People 
Committee for confirmation, where a Council of Confirmation on 
origins of lands or proprieties needs to be formed.  
6. The Council makes cost quotation for each affected household, which 
is then send to the households; after three days, if there are no claims, 
it will send it to competent authorities for appraisal and approval. 
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7. The Province then issues decisions to approve the total costs of 
compensation, including details with the names, area and amounts – 
specified for land, housing and assets. 
8. The Commune People Committee then invites people to receive the 
compensation money, and, if applicable, the details and ownership 
documents for the new land; 
9. Households are then expected to leave their house and land within 20 
days, and there is the necessary supports including: a temporary house 
to live when waiting for new house; canvas shelter provided by district 
military; 
10. The Council then takes over the cleared land, and informs the Province 
of this so that it can be handed over to the project. 
It may be noted that the process was expected not to face too many problems 
for a number of reasons, a main one of course that it was seen as a key project 
of national importance, so it had all attention right up to central levels. The 
Prime Minister and many Vice-Prime Ministers were to pay visits to the project 
area over time. This, in turn motivated and activated direct and determined 
leadership of the provincial authorities. The Province appointed one Vice 
Chairman of People Committee as a Head of VAMU. Finally, as regards 
resettlement, the project was to make sure to use good arrangements for public 
relations, for example providing nice information materials including a Blue 
Print of the resettlement area as a modern city (nice and spacious lay-out, 
under ground electricity cables, good drainage), which did lead to a good 
impression on affected households.   
5   Administrative context and the resettlement procedure 
Overview of Ha Tinh province 
The Vũng Áng EZ is located on the South China Sea (Hoang Sa Arch) in the 
central part of Ha Tinh Province, south of the Provincial capital with the same 
name and in the Kỳ Anh District. It occupies the land (227.81 km²) of 9 
communes including our study areas/communes of Ky Phuong and Ky Loi. 
Ha Tinh is a poor province and its economy is based mainly on agriculture. 
The province is governed by the Provincial People’s Council and the Provincial 
People’s Committee. There are 4 departments under Provincial People’s 
Committee: Department of Planning and Investment, Department of Finance, 
Department of Commerce and Industry and the Department of Construction. 
As indicated already, Provincial People’s Committee and the Provincial 
People’s Council was to set up the Project Management Unit of VAEZ; 
through this unit the Provincial People’s Committee had a direct lead and 
management role in the project. Even while Ha Tinh is not a rich province, its 
leadership has a reputation to be innovative and entrepreneurial (cf. 
CECODES et al. 2010 in the PAPI Competition Index). Its leaders are 
dynamic and committed to change as regards economic reforms with the target 
to increase the industry and services sector – of which VAEZ is an example. 
From our interviews we learnt that the Provincial leaders indicated that they 
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learned much from successful experiences of other (fast growing) provinces 
such as Bắc Ninh, Vĩnh Phúc or Bình Dương, and Hà Tĩnh is now going for 
competition, witness the VAEZ as its crown effort. The Province also scores 
higher than average on the so called Provincial Administrative Performance 
Index PAPI, ranking in fact second amongst 30 provinces that were surveyed 
(Ibid.: CECODES/ UNDP, 2010: 121). The VAEZ is being constructed in the 
Ky Anh District, which counts one township (Kỳ Anh as the district capital) 
and 32 communes (including our study area communes of Kỳ Phương and Kỳ 
Lợi’. Kỳ Anh District is administered by the District’s People Council and the 
District’s People Committee, and, as we will see, it played a key role on as 
regards the resettlement of households displaced by the VAEZ establishment. 
It has a Division of Finance and Planning; one or two staff  are in charge of 
monitoring and identifying the wishes, priorities and needs from all communes 
of the district.  One of the communes most affected by the resettlement of 
people requested to make place for the VAEZ is the Ky Phuong Commune. 
786 households were to be relocated,  and we will provide some more detail on 
the dynamics here.  
 
The Ky Phuong Commune 
The commune consists of 7 villages (or Thons) with the area of 3,500 km2, a 
population of 5,450 people in about 1,300 households. Most people (about 
80%) make a living out of agriculture. Fishing is a side business, which mostly 
occurs in fishing ponds, less so off-shore. The remaining 20 % are the retired, 
teachers, public servants and small traders. Approximately 2,600 persons – 
both men and women – are daily labourers.  The commune is governed by the 
Commune’s People Committee, in which various social organization like the 
Fatherland Front, Women Union, Farmer Union and Youth Union are 
represented. There is also the Commune’s People Council (more like a 
monitoring and controlling body), which consists of 25 persons, who meet 
twice a year but they can hold an extraordinary meeting at any time for urgent 
issues. There are 10 sub-committees in the People Council: one each for all 7 
villages/Thons (the Thon leader is also General Secretary of the Subcommittees) 
and  2 for 2 schools and one for one hospital.  
As is generally the case in Vietnam, there are very close relations between 
the local Communist Party and the commune administration: the chairman of 
the Council was also the Secretary of Commune’s Party at the time of our field 
work. The Council did not have a routine to often meet for matters relating to 
the resettlement; this was delegated to a specially established panel to advise 
the Commune People Committee. This Committee had set up three executive 
units in charge of resettlement and monitoring and to report to the Council. 
The Commune had 209 Party members in total population of 5,450 people. 
The commune Party Executive Committee generally makes an annual plan 
each year, and an overall Commune 5 year plan, while if needed it makes 
urgent and special plans. It was also in charge of all decisions relating to 
resettlement implementation. Annual plan must be approved by the district 
level Party Committee (not the Province). The District then collates and 
consolidates all commune plans it receives to be submitted to the Province (cf. 
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Phuong and Schroeder, 2010:701). The Ky Phuong Commune People 
Committee (CPC) also consists of Party members. Initially there were only two 
party members in the CPC, but that increased to eight by 2010, which means 
that all members of Committee are Party members. It might be that the party 
was keen to be strongly represented in view of the upcoming - very complex 
and sensitive - resettlement process.  
The commune revenue includes mainly fees and charges. About 70% of 
this revenue goes to commune budget, and other revenues are transferred to 
the national budget. The central Government will then redistribute funds for 
communes, where poor communes are allocated more. The commune budget 
will be used for very concrete purposes. One of the interviewed officials 
indicated that he was aware of the Decree on administrative decentralization 
and there were some changes since then: “we got more independence (but he 
did not specify which) and we can make our own plans and solve many local 
economic issues by ourselves.” This respondent also said that there were no 
changes in finances or cash flow.  However, it seems that the commune does 
have some discretion as regards those funds that had not been fully used for 
the centrally earmarked purpose. 
 
Quality of commune cadres 
When asked about the quality of commune officials following the 
decentralisation Decree, one respondent said that individual commune cadres 
should have capacity and skills as regards the following. Such cadres must have 
the skills to make people listen to what (s)he says, and (s)he must be an good 
example to follow ‘cadres need to do job better than the average citizen’, and 
be able to convince people. They need to be close with and understand the 
people, to apply theory into practice. Hence, if they do not learn or study, and 
do not get any decree or certificates, they will not have enough knowledge to 
put this effectively into practice. He also said that all commune cadres here 
were quite competent and well educated, most held diplomas, three of them 
had a bachelor degree, and all staff had professional skill certificates. When 
asking about the difficulties facing the quality of cadres, one respondent said 
that some commune leaders did not have good advisory skills; they did not 
always keep the peace and good relationships within the commune 
organization. There was a lack of some professionals because higher skilled 
people did not want to work at commune levels, which is partly related to low 
salaries (300,000 VND/person/month for part time job), but also to poor 
support facilities. Besides, the number of staff members for each Commune is 
fixed, and is not actually sufficient for all the work. When we asked whether 
they need training and which skills they need most, the respondent answered 
that they most need skills as regards the laws and managing dispute 
settlements. 
Each administrative level is subject to the directions from the next higher 
level. This is realized by (1) laws and legal instructions; (2) official documents; 
and (3) memorandums made up in joint meetings.  According to a respondent, 
in special cases, the higher level authority can send its officials to direct/guide 
the debate/discussion or monitor the implementation at lower levels - and that 
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this had happened frequently as regards the VAEZ case. For example, in Ha 
Tinh Province, the provincial authority had sent many officials to the 
commune to give advice when it felt that certain matters went beyond the 
commune’s competence. Those who are sent to communes may be District 
Party Secretaries, the Chairwomen of Provincial Women Union, 
Representatives of Fatherland Front, all with a view to solve specific issues. 
When we asked whether the supervision and monitoring by higher levels 
bothered them, he answered: “No, we have our own plans and we are quite 
independent...” -which obviously is contradictory. From the point of view of 
the Province it makes sense: there are many interests involved in the very big 
VAEZ project and there is lots of pressure from investors so that close 
monitoring is warranted. 
6  Implementing the resettlement plan: the roles of  
stakeholders at different levels of  administration 
The Ky Phuong Commune started planning the land clearance and 
compensation from July 2008: all (100%) farming land was to be recovered. 
The first step was to retrieve 650,74 ha of cultivable land. The process of 
allocating compensation for agricultural land was carried out in January, 2009. 
The second stage was the land clearance of 110 ha for the resettlement zone, 
where 786 households had to be relocated to a resettlement area. By the time 
of our field work 643 households had received their land lots and were living in 
the new resettlement area; they had lost all their cultivable land, and obviously 
this had a huge impact on livelihoods as well as emotional impacts.  We will 
now first list the various stakeholders in the process who were engaged to 
make all this possible. As indicated, the Central Government in Hanoi, and the 
Provincial People Committee of Ha Tinh province were the key movers and 
drivers of the project, in fact responsible for agenda setting and project design. 
The actual implementation was carried out by the District and Commune 
authorities, aided by the Headmen of the villages (Thon) as well the various 
Mass Organisations. Construction and planning were delegated to specialised 
agencies: the Vung Ang Management Unit and the private sector Xuan Than 
Group. We will briefly depict their roles and activities in the implementation 
process. 
6.1  Management Unit for Vung Ang EZ  and the Province 
The role of Vung Ang EZ Management Unit (VAMU) had several tasks, 
including: a) zoning for projects; b) inviting investments, c) arranging funds for 
land compensation and clearance; d) submitting a proposal to the District to 
set up a Panel of Land Clearance after the project was approved. After the 
Decision on the Resettlement Zone had been made, VAMU drafted the zoning 
plan to be submitted to the provincial authority for approval; then made a 
proposal to the provincial authorities to appoint a contractor for developing 
the infrastructure of the Resettlement Zone. The provincial authority then 
established an Executive Panel for Land Clearance and Resettlement. The 
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Provincial Party Executive Committee subsequently appointed 7 persons,  each 
of which were to be responsible for the individual communes of Ky Anh 
District. Every 2 weeks meetings were organised  at provincial level to review 
the reports made by VAMU. Because the land belongs to Kỳ Anh District, the 
people as well as the responsibility to maintain peace and order are under 
jurisdiction of the District People Committee (DPC). The working relation 
between VAMU and the District Committee is one of coordination. The 
Chairman of DPC is the vice head of VAMU. Throughout the resettlement 
process, the VAMU cooperated with and handed over some responsibilities to 
the commune Party leadership, the Fatherland Front, the Veteran Union, the 
Women Union, the Youth Union: all with a view to join forces and to work 
together in terms of ‘advocacy’ of land clearance in terms of a harmonious and 
efficient process with people’s cooperation.   
6.2  The Kỳ Anh District People Committee (DPC) 
Based on our interviews with the Kỳ Anh DPC officials, we could establish 
that the role of  Kỳ Anh District People Committee was to make plans for 
policy implementation; to provide inputs for making plans: to investigate actual 
realities, number and facts; and to safeguard that the project and resettlement 
objectives were achieved (for example the very important legal stipulation in 
the Land Law that the quality of living at a new location after re-settlement 
must be at least equal to the old one). The diverse tasks include: 
• Inform affected people about project implications, and to monitor all 
implementation. DPC had to create task forces for supervising and 
monitoring, e.g. when doing a survey of households and the 
resettlement zone; 
• DPC determined the location for resettlement in cooperation with 
relevant departments; 
• Consulting with Party Committee to set up the Panel for Land 
Resettlement. This is headed by the Vice Chairman of People 
Committee; 
• Directing relevant department to carry out the surveys; 
• Consulting with the Party Committee to organise the “Removal Festival” 
event, one for each of four affected communes; subsequently land lots 
for the resettlement site were to be allocated;  
• Consulting to launch a program “All the province for Kỳ Anh District” with 
the participation of armed forces, youth, and other organizations and 
other communes; 
• Consulting with provincial authorities to establish compensation rates 
(provinces have authority here); 
• The Panel of Land Clearance is established, headed by the Chairman of 
DPC with representation of the District office divisions of Internal 
Affairs, Finance, Commerce and Investment. The mandates of The 
Panel of Land Clearance includes: compensating affected households; 
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paying all costs and checking all expenditures; engage in advocacy 
towards the people.  
• The Community Monitoring Team is set up. It consists of: the heads of 
all social organizations at commune level, and heads of village at lower 
level. It consists of representatives from Farmer Union, Women 
Union, Veteran Union, the Fatherland Front and the Youth Union. It 
is mandated to follow the process of implementing the resettlement 
project as well as construction quality in the resettlement area, and 
reports to the Commune People Committee. We were informed that 
Team faced difficulties in monitoring, as it lacked adequate 
professional knowledge and skills especially on technical standards, 
We will deal with issues relating to the communication with and actions and 
reactions of the people later. Already now it can be mentioned that there were 
quite some challenges to carry out the diverse implementation tasks, including 
sometimes very severe weather conditions with strong wind and hot weather at 
some times, but also typhoons at others; large volume of work, with strict 
deadlines and limited resources;  and there were reports that sometimes the 
project ran out of money, which was then to be replenished by higher levels. 
6.3 The  Xuân Thành Group  
As indicated, the VAEZ contracted the Xuân Thành Group for constructing 
the complete infrastructure for the resettlement zone in 2009, including  roads, 
sewerage, electricity connection, water supply, but also buildings such as a new 
school and a rather splendid Commune Office. The Technical design was done 
by Hà Tĩnh Consulting and Construction Company, following which  Xuân 
Thành Group started the construction. Before project implementation, the 
province involved in social surveys and in investigations as to zoning and 
planning. The responsibilities of the contractor were to strictly follow the 
approved technical design. Under its contract the Group was to give a 
guarantee for its products/constructions for one year. In practice, the Xuân 
Thành group was responsible for technical infrastructure, and the VAMU as 
well as the commune were responsible for social infrastructure. 
6.4  Party and Administration in Ky Phuong Commune 
At the level of the Commune, the overall lead as regards the Resettlement 
process was with the Commune Party Committee, which is the only Party 
Committee that can mobilize all organizations at the Commune level. It was 
the Party and the Commune People Council that made decisions and approved 
the plans, while monitoring the implementation. In such cases where the 
implementation did not follow the set plan, they informed the Commune 
People Committee with its professional divisions which was the actual 
implementing body. According to one of our respondents of the Ky Phuong 
commune, there was cooperation among different levels of administrations in 
organising the resettlement. The DPC often sent ‘advocacy teams’ to the 
communes, which might stay as long as a month. Generally then, in the case of 
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Vũng Áng Economic Zone, the role of the commune was not about planning, 
but about implementing. From the perspective of the Commune authorities, 
the Vũng Áng Economic Zone was both an opportunity and a large challenge; 
not only brought it the promise of many jobs, but also lots of heavy 
responsibilities to implement the project. The biggest challenge was the 
problem of land clearance and land compensation. At the same time, 
commune leaders had to convince people that they would be able to make a 
new life after resettlement, especially in terms of future jobs after they lost their 
land.  
We will now list the various Mass Organisations which played a very 
important role in the contacts and communications between the 
aforementioned public/government bodies, and the people: to play the role of 
‘advocacy’, which is about convincing convince people, to mediate and put 
pressure.  
6.5   Fatherland Front in Ky Phuong Commune 
The Vung Ang EZ project was initiated by the province, and implemented by 
the district /commune, especially in terms of removing households to clear the 
land for the Project. All organizations at the grassroots level were mobilized to 
support the project, in which the Fatherland Front was engaged in advocacy 
for people to understand and follow the policy; it was not dealing with 
(solving) the concrete problems. 
6.6  Farmer Union in Ky Phuong 
The Farmer Union (FU) of Ky Phuong Commune consists of 7 sub-unions in 
7 villages, in which 4 sub-unions existed in 4 villages that were complexly 
removed (Quyết Tiến, Hồng Hải, Nhân Hòa, Thắng Lợi). The activities of the 
Farmer Union were carried out through an executive committee consisting of 
11 people (3 commune cadres, 7 village cadres and 1 from the electricity 
cooperative). 80% of all farmers are member of the Farmer Union, the fee is 
VND 6.000/year. The Ky Phuong Commune FU was mandated by the 
Commune People Committee to carry out activities relating to agriculture, 
forestry, fishery and their promotion and support, as well as poverty 
alleviation. 
After the Commune was informed about the VAEZ project and the 
resettlement implications, the Executive Committee of Farmer Union held a 
meeting to assign individual members with the responsibility to engage in 
advocacy in each affected village: initially to inform and motivate people as 
regards the planned agricultural land investigation, and secondly about the 
implications of resettlement in terms of real estate, harvest/trees on land and 
property/assets. The main task now entrusted to the commune’s Farmer 
Union by the Commune’s Party Committee was to mediate and inform people 
as regards issues of compensation, land clearance and resettlement. Hence, FU 
advised the commune on issues such as changing jobs, promoting agriculture 
and fishery following resettlement, as well as by listing the poor families 
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needing support in relocation. There were cases that the Commune FU 
received support from the District level FU for example to help poor families. 
One outcome was that Commune Farmer Union received the support of 110 
persons to remove 8 houses and to build up 2 temporary houses.  
6.7  Women Union in Ky PhuongCommune 
The Women Union (WU) in the Ky Phuong Commune counts 1.080 members 
(women above 18 years); most households have at least one member. The 
commune level Women Union cell is led by a full time Chairwoman, one part 
time vice-chairwoman, and a part time administrative employee. WU informed 
us that the quality of WU cadres meets the requirements of the tasks under the 
WU mandate. Besides, as the WU often cooperates with other (mass) 
organizations, which further explains why it is normally able to complete its 
assignments and achieve its objectives.  
After the decision on resettlement had been issued, the Provincial and 
District Women Union organisations held meetings with the Commune 
Women Union to provide information and explain the project and implications 
for people. At the same time it made plans to prepare for an advocacy role as 
regards WU members.  This included the following activities: a) organising 
meetings on resettlement or integrating this topic with other important 
meetings to convince people; usually meetings were held in sub unions (7 sub-
unions in 7 villages); b) sometimes, for example on special days or during 
important holidays, a meeting with all members was organised; c) for some 
members who refused to be relocated, the WU sent its cadres to visit their 
houses to try and convince them (including talking to husbands and children, 
and this could be repeated to as many as 3 visits for one family). Finally, but 
this is a common expectation for any Mass Organisation or Communist Party 
member: the cadres of the Women Union must present an example which all 
others can follow. It was argued by some members that ‘WU Members are 
women so they are soft and flexible… they can understand the conditions of 
each other so they are convinced’.  
Apart from advocacy, the WU also cooperated with other organizations 
(Youth Union, Farmer Union) under the leadership of Commune People 
Committee to support member families to move to relocation sites. The 
Provincial Women Union launched skills training programs for women who 
had been relocated; at the time of our study, about 20 members were learning 
sewing at the Provincial Training School in Ha Tinh city. Finally, the WU 
informed its members about the policy that those households ready to leave 
first to the relocation area would receive of a VND 1 million bonus, so as to 
encourage its members to help implement the policy. 
6.8  Youth Union in Ky Phuong  Commune 
The Commune level Youth Union (YU) played a very important role as 
regards implementing the resettlement policy. Like the other mass 
organisations, its members already acted before the actual resettlement in what 
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may be called ‘advocacy work’. In cooperation with other organizations they 
contacted households for providing information and to convince them. In 
particular, they visited families with members of the YU, as they better 
understood the thinking and behaviour of such families, then reporting back to 
the Commune Monitoring Team. For households that did resisted to be 
relocated for certain reasons, as a last resort the Youth Union was ready to 
apply some measures, for example not to invite a young family member to 
participate in a class of understanding the Party (this, in effect, means that such 
a person can never become a Party member).  
The YU was however most active during the actual process of relocating 
households. Being as a vanguard force with strengths and enthusiasm, the 
Youth Union launched broad programs to help people shift people: a) 
mobilizing other YU members of villages that had not yet moved to be 
volunteers to help people (hauling furniture, building up temporary shelter). In 
all 30 YU members from other villages joined, each receiving VND 20,000 per 
day for buying petrol for their motorbikes; b) members supported the sensitive 
and important work to relocate anonymous graves: making plans, requesting 
funds from the project (1.5 million VND per grave), then hiring a dignitary for 
a ceremony. In total 15 anonymous graves were so relocated;  c) in cooperation 
with other near-by Youth Unions and higher level Youth Unions, the 
Commune YU made frequent field visits and made reports (what remains to be 
done; how many people left, when and how) that were submitted to the 
Commune People Committee; d) members from a nearby YU stayed in the 
commune for a week, and there organised many community based activities 
(singing, volleyball, cinema). Also, the YU of the Viet-Germany Training 
School helped people to repair electricity appliances free of charge: all this 
created lots of goodwill amongst the people.  
Following the relocation of households, the Commune YU engaged in 
planting trees (on pavements, public places, parks). Also, after relocation, its 
members made a list of YU members who had job certifications and of those 
who did not. They then tried to find jobs for members with certifications, and 
to enrol those without certificates in the Training School No 5.  
6.9 Commune Police in Ky Phuong 
The commune police was charged with monitoring the project implementation 
process, starting from the date the project was approved. It was to 
monitor/understand the conditions, thinking and behaviour of the people, and 
report on this to the Party Committee. It was also charged to protect officials 
and private sector/investor businessmen when they visited and worked in the 
area. More concretely, when many people refused to cooperate with the initial 
investigation, the Commune Police was mandated to contact such people, and 
try to convince them that it would be better to make a move. 
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6.10  The role of Community Monitoring Team 
The establishment of the CMT was already discussed before: it included 
representatives of the Mass Organizations, and was headed by the Chairman of 
the Commune People Committee, with as Acting Chairman the Vice-President 
of Commune People Council. Among other things, the team was in charge of 
monitoring construction quality, for example checking the quality and hardness 
of concrete. However there are indications that the CMT was not fully 
mandated to monitor and assess the quality of the important constructions and 
services of the Xuân Thành Group. The reason was said to be that the CMT 
had been established before the project, so that it did not have the right to 
check on the Xuân Thành Group. This was seen as a rather big error, and may 
be one reason that construction quality at the relocation site was not always up 
to standard. 
6.11  The case of the Kỳ Lợi Commune 
Most of our data were collected in the Ky Phuong Commune, but we briefly 
report here on some interviews held in the Ky Loi commune, where 250 
households had to be resettled to a relocation area. At the time of our research, 
about 190 had left their original hamlet. The resettlement plans were very 
controversial in this commune, approximately 110 households had initially 
indicated to refuse to go: “swearing by drinking blood” not to move. Among 
them there were some households which were in fact ready to leave but which 
were under pressure by others (the majority) not to go - they were threatened 
and frightened by others. It was even more problematic that the leaders of the 
Commune themselves did not agree with the resettlement, which created quite 
some headaches for the District and Provincial authorities. These leaders were 
subsequently removed, and a new and strong General Secretary of the Ky Loi 
Commune was sent to head the local Communist Party branch. This ex-army 
official emphasised during discussions that the project had not properly 
recognized the critical role of the local leadership, which made it possible for 
such leaders to avoid and boycott difficult decisions. He also stressed ‘the Party 
leads, the People Committee implements’. Following the Commune leadership 
crisis new leaders were appointed and they succeeded to mobilise the support 
of the Women Union and the Farmers Front. 
The Commune CPC then set up set up an Investigation Team, targeting 
two households initially and later having success also with others. The Party 
Committee took these developments very serious, and the District Party 
Acting Committee decided to add more cadres, while the Commune Party 
Secretary stayed in the Kỳ Lợi Commune several days over many weeks, 
visiting people at night. The Commune Party Secretary also organised meetings 
to voice his opinion on the matter. In cooperation with Fatherland Front, 
other organizations engaged in trying to convince and to persuade people too. 
However, different organisations suggested different strategies, for example to 
simply use more force; to make available much more information on the 
project, relocation policy and pricing- hence enhancing accountability and 
transparency; yet others suggested an increase of the compensation amounts 
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with 50 million VND for each household, or 4 million VND for one 
individual. The Commune Party issued a Resolution No 28 to make clear that 
it was ready to lead people towards relocation.  
Finally, after lots of commotion and a flurry of activity by many 
organisations, the Opening Ceremony for Relocation for the Kỳ Lợi 
Commune took place on March 10, 2010. Any household which was ready to 
go first would get priority to choose a land plot on the relocation site (it is for 
example best to start a shop on a corner plot or main road). Those who went 
first also got bonus of 10 million VND/family. Yet even at that time there was 
protest. Initially, those actually agreeing to leave first were threatened by the 
protesters, but later most of them also realised that moving first would bring 
benefits. Then, on June 20, 2010 the while commune area had been vacated, 
and the Commune handed over all the cleared land to the VAEZ / 
FORMOSA, after removing 720 graves, as well as 18 Houses of Worship. 
7   People’s reactions, and people’s participation? 
7.1 Attitudes and reactions of the community to the 
resettlement and land acquisition plans 
As already indicated, the number of households in the Ky Phuong commune 
which was to be shifted to the new relocation site was 786. This was a dramatic 
fact: not only the house and homestead lands, the graves and graveyard, but 
also all cultivated/farming land was acquired. Things might have been different 
if the local authorities could have offered other farming lands in compensation, 
but this was not the case. As will be elaborated later, all compensation was in 
the form of a new housing site of 400 square meters in the relocation area; 
support for removing household belongings; compensation for house and 
land; and some training for new jobs. But for the majority of village people 
who were farmers the plans for the Vung Ang EZ meant a complete change of 
life. The fishing households were to lose their traditional fishing port after the 
seep sea port would be ready and the Formosa Group starting the production 
of iron and steel (annex 2). There are no other suitable fishing ports nearby. 
It meant the complete removal of whole villages, which had been viable 
communities since time memorial with traditions, networks, memories and the 
blessings of the ancestors. All this was to disappear and in the present section 
we will depict the reactions of affected households. As was to be expected 
these started with shock and disbelief, followed by denial and protest, ending 
with resignation and adjustments of living and survival in the new area. And, to 
provide a balanced view, the VAEZ plans also meant a huge challenge for the 
local authorities, which were suddenly caught in the eye of a storm, almost 
literally ‘between the devil and the deep blue sea’, but concretely between high 
level orders and plans from the Prime Minister in Hanoi, and very dissatisfied 
local villagers.  
While eventually these local officials organised many (information, 
‘consultation’) meetings as will be elaborated later, initially people only heard 
rumours, lacking solid information. So when people heard about the VAEZ  
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project, one reaction was that the project would have to be examined in terms 
of national security. They saw a risk that the project would divide the country 
into two parts, which must be understood in terms of Vietnam-China relations 
and the proximity of Ha Tinh Province to Laos. Many people perceived 
construction of a deep sea port and a large Economic Zone as opening 
Vietnam to outside forces. People were concerned that all this would make the 
route from China to Laos easier, and they feared a Chinese presence. However, 
after the information meetings had started and things had been explained, the 
people agreed with the development of the Vung Ang EZ.  
The next problem to be addressed was to clear the land and organize 
compensation for the people. The process of land acquisition went relatively 
well and expeditious, but officials did indicate that it was a difficult and 
sensitive task. The District/Commune Committees (in many cases 
accompanied by cadres from the provincial level, or even the Vice Chairman of 
the Provincial Committee) held many meetings with the people (see the next 
chapter). First the authorities engaged in discussing the location of the 
resettlement area, and to subsequently select one. After lots of discussion, 
deliberation and many meetings the people selected one area from the four 
possible locations. Although eventually a majority of the people agreed with 
the policy of relocation, some still objected. It happened that when the 
investigators visited their houses to carry out the task of assessing the nature of 
land and property, they kept the door shut, and said: “this is my house and 
there is no need at all to do survey because I do not have any thing to do with 
that”. In order to deal with this problem, the authorities opted for the strategy 
to investigate first the land and real estate of the households of commune 
cadres or party members (who are naturally more cooperative, being expected 
to provide an example). However, when these volunteers agreed to be 
investigated, many others objected, and they threw stones on the houses of 
those cooperating at night – in some villages all the families which agreed to 
the investigation were the target of attacks. There are even reports of some 
places where people did not allow anybody to carry out the investigation, even 
throwing stones at the investigators. Some protesters were organised in groups 
of 20-25 persons to prevent investigators. In one village there was a case where 
a father-in-law who agreed to the investigation was the target of stone 
throwing by his own daughter-in-law. 
Throwing stones on a roof or into a house caused damage to many houses 
and to household items such as furniture. Local authorities had an interesting 
response to this. Households which suffered damage were compensated from 
the social fund budget line of the commune. This fund is normally used for 
repairing or building community assets such as a pagoda, a church, 
kindergarten, a road and so on. This strategy immediately affected the 
community as it reduced its common fund. This, in combination with 
strategies of advocacy and explanation, helped to gradually put an end to the 
protest actions of “throwing stones”. The Commune Police was not sitting idly 
either; they invited protesters to come to the Police office, and they were ready 
to explain things time and again. They also supported other efforts aimed at 
convincing people, and protected people who were targeted or protected. They 
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patrolled affected areas at night, trying to identify the groups of protesters, 
inviting the group leaders to come to the commune headquarter the next day. 
In total 15 persons were invited, some of them several times. There was one 
case where the Commune Police had to admit defeat, and was forced to hand 
the case of one protester to the district police (this person was heading a group 
of 25 protesters). Ultimately the Women Union was able to convince his wife; 
the Youth Union convinced his children and only later the Veteran Union 
managed to convince him also. However, other protesters were still not to be 
convinced, or had grave doubts about the relocation process and 
compensation amounts. They collected money from local people to enable 
them to go Hanoi to find out the precise details about the different amounts 
that were circulating as compensation for land and houses. And they did go to 
Hanoi, only to find that the compensations amounts were determined by the 
Province. So they came back and accepted the facts as given by the authorities 
and the given compensation amounts.  
There were also many other protesters in one villages who were very vocal 
during meetings, demanding better provisions especially in relation to the costs 
of compensation and the nature of the relocation site and housing. At one 
occasion one person got very angry and he caused disorder by pulling the 
clothes of a speaker during a meeting. This, and other cases, proved that 
people had many doubts and worries about the compensation amounts- one 
could say rightly so as all the assets they owned in housing and land were 
suddenly put to value: this was the money they would have to live with from 
now on. So protest and doubts were omnipresent: one party member we talked 
to said they had to convince one household up to 70 times to get its 
agreement. And while most households which had agreed on and accepted the 
compensation were actually shifted to the relocation area, about 10 households 
received the monetary compensation but still they did not want to go: they had 
to be forcefully evicted by the site clearance board established by the District 
People’s Committee. There were cases where people had to be reminded up to 
5 times (in Kỳ Long Commune) before actually being ready to move. 
A more peaceful but rather more effective strategy was for households to 
split up into more households before the investigations commenced. There are 
indications that in the Ky Phuong commune over the two years preceding the 
relocation, the number of new households which separated from the old ones 
increased by 100-150. Many persons who did not actually have wedding plans, 
now got married to create a new household - so as to be able to claim a 
separate new housing site in the relocation area. In the six months prior to our 
study period, there had been 62 marriages. Another dimension of the 
impending relocation was that this attracted banks which were interested in 
deposits, but also other persons interested in buying things. This caused unrest 
in villages. The police recognised this as an unwanted development and banned 
these persons from the villages so as to maintain law and order.  
Then, when the dust relating to the protests had settled down, from late 
2008 household began to receive money compensation. For many households, 
it was the first time ever that they received such a large amount. To help 
people to keep their money safely, the authorities invited representatives of 
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banks to come to get deposits from households. Many agreed and deposited 
their money into the banks for later use, for example for house construction, 
housing repair or changing jobs. During the day of compensation money 
disbursement, the banks organised various promotional programs for their 
clients to encourage the people to make deposits.  At this stage, a household 
which was to be moved was to receive 18 million VND for each 1 sào 
(equivalent to 360 square meter) of agricultural land (including the money for 
supporting a change of work). At the same time, families who had a place of 
worship like a small temple received an additional 3 million VND so as to be 
able to build a new (or temporary) worship place in resettlement zone.  
Following the payments of compensation, the process started of 
households being shifted to the new relocation area. As many households 
remained reluctant to actually leave the places where they had lived so long, 
and as there the atmosphere of protest had created uneasiness, not many 
households were volunteering to go. As already mentioned, the local 
authorities then announced that households who went first would be given the 
opportunity to select any site in the new area, as well as to receive 5 million 
VND by way of bonus. All households were provided with support with 
shifting (a monetary compensation to pay for 5 lorry trucks/trips for each 
household). The Commune office established an agent to sell construction 
materials, paid for the cost of hiring a temporary location to live until the final 
house was ready, and mediated with construction material suppliers not to 
increase their prices due to the sudden peak in demand.  
For the Ky Phuong Commune, the removal of households was relatively 
easy because the place of resettlement was not far away from their old houses; 
for that reason the amounts allocated for shifting were limited to only 5 million 
VND per household. The land selected for the relocation site was located 
in/near the western hills. The few households which were living here also 
received compensation when their land was retrieved. However, one 
household stubbornly refused to be relocated and it was ultimately forced to 
move out. The reason was that this household did not agree with the costs of 
compensation. The cost of compensation was 54 million VND per 1 sào (360 
m2) in early 2009 under the regulations as issued by the Government, but as 
per the decision of Hà Tĩnh Province, this would have to be (only) about 18 
million for 1 sào. Therefore, there was a big difference between two these 
regulations. People had this idea that the decision (compensation rate) of 
province was not beneficial to them, as the amount stipulated by the 
Government was much higher. This problem was not explained clearly by the 
Hà Tĩnh Province authorities. As a result, many households claimed the higher 
amount in their interactions with District and Commune officials, and waited 
for the answers from provincial authorities. Many hoped that the province 
would increase the compensation to offset the gap between two levels of 
compensation. It was this gap in compensation that led to the forced eviction 
of one specific household, which husband kept maintaining until the very end 
that the compensation was not consistent with existing laws. This goes to show 
that it is very important that the authorities explain the details of the 
compensation policy very clearly. Let us therefore now consider the 
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interactions and interfaces between people and the local authorities in the 
processes leading to relocation and compensation. 
7.2 Types of consultation 
The implementation of community consultation as regards land acquisition and 
resettlement are clearly regulated by the Ordinance on Grassroots Democracy 
Nr. 29 of 1998 ‘Regulations on the Exercise of Democracy in Communes’ (VN 
Govt, 1998, 2003) and another Democracy Regulation nr. 79 of 2003; as well 
the government Degree No 69 and some other legal documents. They can be 
seen as an effort by the Vietnamese government to enhance the rights of the 
people at the commune and village levels to participate in local government 
affairs. It appears that the eviction and relocation process kept in mind 
provisions of these decrees. One official talked about the Nr. 79 and said that 
socio-economic plans need many inputs from the people: he felt that there 
should be a close relationship between the Commune People Council and the 
people, and that meetings should be held. This was especially the case with 
land clearance: people need to be informed and consulted. Regarding the 
implementation of the resettlement and land acquisition plans in Ky Phuong 
commune, Ky Anh district, the local authority appears to have followed the 
regulations mentioned above. There were three types of community 
consultation: (i) Village meetings; (ii) Household visiting by local officers and 
(iii) Individual meeting at local offices. 
But in the very initial stage, when the project on VAEZ was announced 
from Hanoi, the Commune first organised meetings with the participation of 
representatives of various social organizations and the Heads of villages/thons. 
Only after that meetings with the people were organised, with attendance of 
representatives from the District and/or Commune offices. In such meeting 
where the people met with officials, the commune and district police without 
uniform also attended so as to monitor and study the proceedings. In such 
meetings officials listened carefully to the views and opinions of the people 
present. These were also written up in memoranda, and submitted to higher 
levels of administration i.e. the Province. Representatives of the People 
Committees, the Fatherland Front, members of the Council of Compensation, 
as well as members of the Vung Ang Management Unit and  investors 
participated in the meetings. Any questions by people were answered or 
written down in the memorandum to submit to higher level. Many suggestions 
and proposals from the people were approved. In general one could say that 
the local authorities saw the strategy of consulting communities as an 
opportunity to engage in advocacy activities. Meetings, obviously, also served 
the purpose to explain things directly to the people. If people – or indeed 
officials – were not clear on any matter, the Commune officials would convey 
such issues to District or Provincial officials so as to be able to provide correct 
feedback to the people. 
34 
 
Participation of people at commune level: meetings 
Generally, when the Commune intends to implement a project or policy, the 
first step is to organise a meeting of the relevant Commune Acting Panel, 
followed by a meeting of Commune Party and all Party Committees. This 
would then be followed by meeting with the village people. After all, it is the 
Commune which is responsible to identify and establish the ownership and 
boundaries of land, and hold meetings to inform Commune inhabitants of 
policies and guidelines. It is the Province which designs policies and makes 
decisions to be implemented at lower levels. This also explains why village level 
meetings are often attended by authorities from provincial or district levels, 
and why Commune officials often accompany District’s panels to visit 
households. It appears that, as part of processes of participation of grassroots 
people, approximately 10 meetings were held in each village, but in some 
places it was even more (12 in one case). Those meetings concerning policy 
and compensation were attended by representatives of the district or provincial 
level. One respondent, an official, said that experience with land acquisition 
and clearance and resettlement had shown that things work best in a context 
where people know and where  people are consulted; transparency and 
democracy are the key elements that makes such processes easier. He so 
seamlessly linked to the philosophy of the Grassroots Democracy policies of 
Vietnam; let us now consider whether and how this worked out in practice.  
 
Village meetings 
The authorities of various levels in Ha Tinh province did attach much 
importance to community consultation regarding the implementation of 
resettlement plan for the Vung Ang economic zone at Ky Anh district. While 
the meetings were organised by the Commune, officials of province as well as 
district offices often attended village meetings in order to inform people on 
compensation and to garner support for the resettlement plans. Data collected 
in our survey in two villages (Hong Hai and Quyet Tien) of Ky Phuong 
commune indicate that a majority of the 70 households interviewed (more than 
90 %) did take part in meetings on compensations for land acquisition and 
resettlement. However, a decline can be discerned over time; gradually 
attendance dropped to about 70 or 80% households; in the end the percentage 
was even lower, especially at the time when the controversies around the 
investigation of land and assets started (as mentioned earlier).  
TABLE 7.1 
 Participation of communities in meetings on resettlement and land acquisition 
Participation N % 
Attend meetings 64 91,4 
Not attend 6 8,6 
Total 70 100,0 
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Of our respondents, 87.1 % said that the officials of province or district offices 
attended the meetings 2-3 times or more during the resettlement process. 
From discussions with officials and people in the field we learned that the 
Vice-Chairman of Ha Tinh people’s committee, come to the community to 
attend village meetings many times during the process of land acquisition and 
resettlement. The presence of such a high-ranking Provincial official at village 
meetings was a clear indication how seriously the Province took the 
implementation of land acquisition and resettlement, but also that they 
perceived it to be rather important and complicated. After all, the performance 
of land acquisition and resettlement were critical building blocks for 
establishing the  VAEZ – the largest provincial project with the expectation of  
large positive socio-economic development impacts. At the same time, the 
Province was aware that the capacity of the Local Authorities at district and 
commune level was limited in general, and especially with a view to such new 
and ambitious efforts such as land acquisition and resettlement. The district or 
commune officials were in no position to act on requests from affected people 
as regards rates of compensation or land acquisition details. For this reason, 
the Ha Tinh Province People’s Committee had issued many legal documents 
and guidelines to facilitate work at lower levels of administration. All this goes 
to confirm that the Provincial level makes policy starting from general 
policies/regulations of the central government; and that subsequently the 
district and commune level authorities only engage in policy implementation. 
However, due to the limited capacity at lower levels of administration, the 
provincial authority also became engaged in implementation processes of land 
acquisition and resettlement.  
TABLE 7.2 
 Officials of province or district offices attending village meetings 
Attend meetings N % 
Many times 29 46,8 
2-3 times 25 40,3 
One time 5 8,1 
Never 3 4,8 
Total 64 100,0 
Household visiting 
Besides the village meetings, officials of the Commune and members of the 
Mass Organizations such as the Women Union and Youth Union (see chapter 
4 & 6) organised household visits, so as to fill existing information gaps and a 
lingering lacks of information/understanding of affected people. They were 
ready to explain policy details, but there was definitely also an agenda to 
persuade people to support the resettlement plans. A number of households 
was visited more than once, which again underlines that land acquisition and 
resettlement planning in Ky Anh district was difficult and complex. For 
example, as indicated, one half to two thirds of the affected households were 
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not satisfied with the compensation. The frequency of such household visits 
increased over time, as the Authorities felt the keen urgency to finalise the land 
acquisition and land clearance. After all, if a large number of  households 
would keep on refusing to agree to the offered compensation and to move to 
the resettlement areas, the implementation of the land acquisition planning 
could not be completed in time and that would again cause problems vis-à-vis 
the Vung Ang Managament Unit, and behind them the investors such as the 
Formosa Group which had their own planning deadlines. The initial date to 
complete the land acquisition was April 2010; it had to be extended to the end 
of August already. It helps explain why the Vice-chairman of Ha Tinh 
provincial people’s committee felt compelled to attend village meetings many 
times during the process of land acquisition and resettlement for Formosa 
project.  
TABLE 7.3 
 Did commune officials come to visit your house regarding resettlement? 
Answer N % 
Yes 47 67,2 
No 22 31,4 
Don’t know 1 1,4 
Total 70 100,0 
Individual meeting at local offices 
Even while there were many meetings, where people raised issues and 
indicated problems such as the perceived low amounts of compensation, the 
fear of unemployment after resettlement, the nature and quality of 
infrastructure in resettlement zone, for many people doubts still remained. In 
such cases, or when they had specific individual issues or requests, they could 
meet local officials. About half the respondents in our survey did so. It 
indicates that village meetings and household visiting by the officials were not 
sufficient to satisfy the people regarding the compensation of land and assets. 
It implies that the compensation rates were seen to be low, but also that the 
property inventories of assets other than land (houses and facilities, fishing 
ponds, sheds, trees, places of worship) had not been carried out to their 
satisfaction. Hence, some people complained that some of their property items 
had not been taken into account, or had been compensated with lower rates 
compared to other households. More generally, some households had 
complaints as regards transparency and equality of the whole resettlement 
process. Implicitly there are indications of corruptions here, when a Clearance 
Board member might try to organise a higher compensation/assessment of the 
property of a relative than the actual value (corruption appears to be a large 
issue generally in land management in Vietnam (World Bank and Denmark 
Embassy, 2011). This, in turn may be related to the limited capacity of officials 
at district and commune levels who personally and directly dealt with 
households.  
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TABLE 7.4 
 Did you contact local officials regarding resettlement? 
Answer N % 
Yes 34 48,6 
No 25 35,7 
I did not know 
whom to meet 
11 15,7 
Total 70 100,0 
Summary 
As can be seem in the above, all local authorities in Ha Tinh province did 
follow the regulations stated in the Regulation on Grassroots  Democracy in 
communes (1998, 2003) as well as the government Degree No 69 dated on 
August 13, 2009 and other relevant legal documents. Based on evidence 
collected in the communes and resettlement site, it can be concluded that the 
affected households and communities were adequately informed about the 
resettlement plans. They were informed and consulted as regards their 
reactions and questions in three main ways: village meetings, household visits 
and people visiting local officials. Officials of authorities of various levels of 
Ha Tinh province all took part in these processes; providing information on 
the plans, rates of compensation, and noting reactions. It was particularly 
district and commune levels who engaged to persuade people to accept the 
resettlement plans and who were first in line to receive requests and complains. 
In the end, all households did agree to move, however only after a number of 
their requests were accepted. The process of consultation on resettlement 
plans was long and complicated, and it took four months longer than 
anticipated to clear the land. This is partly evidence that people had a voice in 
planning, that there were ‘invited spaces’ (Gaventa, 2005) where people could 
engage with the authorities. At the same time much of the ‘consultation’ seems 
to have been rather ‘top-down’ in nature: people would be invited to meetings, 
but there appears to have been only little scope to actually offer policy or plan 
alternatives, for example to help plan or give ideas for the lay-out of the 
resettlement area, how people could be clustered in neighbourhood or clan-
groups etc. And finally, it was also clear as shown in the initial section of this 
chapter that people were not at all happy with what had been planned for 
them, that many were very upset and angry. Much of the ‘consultation’ then 
took the form of ‘advocacy’ or ‘persuasion’, whereas there was also pressure- 
sometimes rather forcefully- on individual households or individuals to make a 
move or else. But there were certainly also shifts in the position of the 
authorities, who did make adjustments in the compensation policy, in 
providing extra incentives to persuade people- which goes to show that people 
did have some voice. That the process had a delay of four months should not 
be seen as very long, rather as proof of a relatively very well managed complex 
process of policy implementation.   
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8  Compensation for land and assets and realities at the 
relocation site 
Compensation for land and other assets: the context 
As part of the process of resettlement, and as laid down by law and in various 
decrees, compensation arrangements includes two phases; first retrieving 
agricultural land, which compensation in fixed amounts of  money per sau (360 
sqm), but extra compensation was given for trees, gardens, crops, fishing 
ponds on that land. Besides the compensation for land, people were also 
entitled to compensation for constructions built on the land and other 
properties attached to the land such as an outside kitchen, toilet, animal shelter. 
Secondly, as regards the acquisition of residential land the compensation 
depended on different kinds of ownership: whether people have the Red 
Book/Land Use Certificate, no Red Book3, or another type of land use (at 
least 72,000 VND/m2 in 2009, may be more). Thirdly, there is compensation 
for the house as a structure: for low quality houses: 1.5 million VND/per m2, 
for multi-storey houses: 3 million VND/m2. Then there was compensation for 
miscellaneous expenses, such as that each household received 5 million to 
finance expenses for the removal of belongings by truck, medicines, student 
textbooks, as well as instalments for electricity and water on the new site. 
When a grave of a household had to be shifted, each house hold received 
VND 8 million. An entire new cemetery was built at a cost of VND 30 billion 
in an area close to the relocation site of the Ky Trinh commune. Finally, and 
again as regulated by law, part of compensation must include free job training 
(e.g. sewing, working with bamboo or steel); as well as the provision of job 
orientation (mediating as regards services around the industrial zone, cattle 
raising).  
All in all, the compensation process was complex and laborious if only as a 
result of all these various components and modalities. Other factors made it 
more complex still: a) it was a large project, affecting many households; b) 
obviously, land clearance and compensation related to many social, cultural and 
religious problems as manifested in the presence of tombs, graves, temples, 
pagodas (as per the regulations, the local authorities had to consult with the 
Cultural Department in case a pagoda was to be removed); c) amounts of 
compensation where different over time, leading to feelings of injustice and 
claims of people, and d), as soon as the land was acquired, and farmers lost 
their agricultural land, the issue of employment for people became urgent - 
people had to adjust to new ways of  working and living, even if they still lived 
in their own houses. And as quite a large number of people suddenly did not 
                                                
3 Land ownership is complex in Vietnam where the state owns all the land, but where 
since the 1993/2003 land laws people have Land Use Certificates (LUCs or Red 
Book) which now can also be transferred, sold and mortgaged. Nevertheless different 
types LUCs exist, while some people have used land while not having LUC (for 
example common commune lands). Different compensation amounts relate to such 
situations (de Wit, 2011). 
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have jobs, some ‘social evils’ emerged like gambling, drinking, quarrelling and 
fighting.  
 
Realities in Ky Phuong 
As a result of establishing the Vung Ang Economic Zone households from 5 
communes were relocated in 2009-10 to the new resettlement area located in 
the  Kỳ Trinh commune, leaving both houses and land. This is not to say that 
all of them were relocated, and this was not the case either for people of the 
Ky Phuong Commune. But it was in this commune that most fieldwork was 
carried out: most evidence presented here originates there (survey N=70).  
A local official of Ky Phuong commune said that there were village meetings 
with affected households on resettlement and land acquisition planning during 
March – April 2008. As indicated in the above sections, it became clear in these 
meetings that many villagers did not support the resettlement and land 
acquisition planning due to three reasons: the compensation amounts were 
seen to be too low, while other support measures were perceived as 
insignificant, including the support policy for career/job change which was not 
suitable. Then there was also the fact that in October 2009 a new decree fixed 
the land compensation amount at a higher level. The people of Ky Phuong 
Commune received compensation under the previous pre-2009 rules; the 
people of the Ky Loi commune were compensated after October 2009 and 
received more. This too was a strong factor for dissatisfaction in the former 
commune.  
Regarding the compensation, initially the compensation for each sao of 
cultivated land was to be 8 million VND4 (or VND 16.000 per M2). When 
many people did not support the land acquisition and protested and 
complained about the low compensation, the local authority submitted a 
request to the Provincial People’s Committee to increase the compensation. 
The rate of compensation was subsequently adjusted from 8 to 16 million 
VND, through an administrative adjustment through which the compensated 
land was re-ranked onto a higher category. The compensation for 
cultivated/farm land in Ky Phuong commune was completed in January-
February 2009.  
When the new Degree No 69 took effect in October 2009, the rate of 
compensation for cultivated land generally was raised by two to three times, 
and this was of benefit to the people of Ky Loi commune, who received 
compensation after October 2009. Obviously, some people in Ky Phuong 
questioned this, and voiced the view that the affected households in their 
commune of Ky Phuong suffered losses regarding the compensation for 
cultivated land: the people of Ky Loi commune next to the Ky Phuong 
commune would get about 50 million VND for each acre of cultivated land for 
the same category. This was seen as very unjust because both the Ky Phuong 
                                                
4 At this stage, a household which was to be moved was to receive 16 million VND 
for each 1 sào (equivalent to 360 square meter) of agricultural land. 
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(with a compensation of VND 16 million) and Ky Loi communes were 
affected by the same project of VAEZ. 
Apart from this perceived injustice, many people questioned the value 
assessment of the land also from the perspective of market prices, and here we 
will discuss the compensation of ‘housing/residential land’, i.e. the land on 
which the house was located in the commune – as compared to farm land- 
discussed above. The rate of compensation for a square metre of living land in 
Ky Anh district was 72,000 VND in 2010. This appears rather low compared 
to the market price of about 800,000 VND as reported by local people. In 
addition, it may be noted that households which owned large residential 
housing sites, lost comparatively more than people with smaller residential sites 
in their old village. In fact, households with small housing sites benefited well. 
Every registered household to be relocated was allowed to buy a housing site 
of 400 square metres for 72,000 VND in the new resettlement area, regardless 
of how large is their former housing site. The data we collected randomly from 
70 households in the Ky Phuong commune indicate that there were 31 
households (44,3 %) that used to have residential sites smaller than 400 square 
meters (average size was 248 m2). In contrast, there were 39 households (55,7 
%) that used to have larger sites than their new sites of 400 sq.m. (average plot 
size was 873 m2).  
So while all households could claim a 400 m2 new housing site, this was 
irrespective of the number of people in the household: households with 1-2 
persons got the same housing site as those with 6-7 people. This, again, can be 
seen as a weakness in the resettlement policy. However, as already noted, the 
number of households increased quickly after the relocation plans were 
announced. A local official noted that approximately hundred new households 
were registered since the resettlement plan started. For example, in some 
households a son decided – with the happy support of his parents - to marry 
earlier than planned, so as to set up a new household, so being able to buy a 
plot of land at a very cheap price. If this worked well, they could make a profit 
of about 300 million VND per case. However, by and large, about half of the 
respondents were not satisfied with the compensation. 
TABLE 8.1 
 People’s opinions on the rate of compensation for land and property 
Rate of compensation N % 
Acceptable 23 32,9 
Not acceptable 35 50,0 
Don’t know 12 17,1 
Total 70 100,0 
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It may be noted that people than had numerous complaints about the 
compensation, and these were reported to the local authorities. The latter were 
quite ready to receive and document these, but, being quite powerless in terms 
of decision making; they duly made numerous requests to the provincial offices 
in order to adjust the rates of compensation. A lot of such requests were 
accepted, so that a number of households did receive additional compensations 
for several property items. In addition, the provincial authority also increased 
amounts of compensation through providing some more support for moving 
people. For example, each household was given 5 million VND for relocating 
to the new resettlement area; every labourer was given 5 million VND to be 
trained for new employment; every person beyond 60 years of age was 
provided with 15 kg of rice per month for a period of 5 years and so on. 
However, not all these plans were immediately implemented. In addition to the 
support of 5 million VND for shifting belongings, there was a decision that 
households who would agree to go first would not have to pay for the truck to 
move things. This did not actually happen and households did pay themselves 
after all, so it was proposed that the province authorities consider paying this 
expense. Also, at the time of our fieldwork, the Province was yet to hold its 
promise to provide 15kg of rice/month/person for 36 months, as people had 
not received this. This may be an indication of complexities leading from the 
actual separation of decision making (provincial level) and implementation and 
consultation (district and commune).  
 
Realities in the new settlement 
By the time of our research, the people of the Ky Phuong who were to move 
had been relocated to the new site. It was already mentioned that people had 
made a choice of 4 possible locations; the location chosen was located 
relatively near the centre of the District capital of Ky Anh, and near the 
national high road nr 1, which links Hanoi with Ho Chi Minh City all along the 
Vietnam coast. There had been a plan to build actual houses for all household 
at this relocation site, but the people had themselves proposed to provide them 
with land plots as well as the required infrastructure such as roads, electricity, 
schools, a health post, the offices of the People Committee, People Council 
and local Party branch. 
In August 2010, lots of building activity was going on- both by the one 
contractor Xuan Thanh which had been given the task to prepare the entire 
relocation area for habitation. One could clearly see the outlines of the new 
area, given a well-planned lay-out with wide roads, relatively spacious housing 
sites (400 m2), spaces for parks, the administrative CPC building (spacious, as 
always) and  a school. However, while many households were already living 
here, nothing was quite ready yet. Labourers were constructing roads, water 
drains, sewerage lines, while most public buildings were only half completed. 
Trucks with materials were constantly on the move; piles of construction 
materials were everywhere. It was obvious that the planning for these large 
works had not been adequate; it was widely expected that the one and only 
construction company would need at least a year more to complete everything 
– and there were more relocation areas. All of these were contracted to the 
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Xuan Thanh construction group. This may explain why they could not 
complete the construction of all resettlement areas before the affected 
households moved in. This led to some people telling us that they felt that they 
had been cheated: they agreed to a relocation with lots of nice promises and 
expectations: now that they were in their new area there were no roads, no 
pavements and inadequate supply of water and electricity. Approximately 40 
households had received the compensation money already but could not yet 
get a new land plot because the Xuân Thành Group had not completed on-site 
infrastructure. There were complaints also about the location of manholes, 
which were at a higher level than the road. However, this cannot solely be 
blamed on Xuan Thanh; some people were not used to water taps, ‘not 
civilised’, failing to turn off the tap after use. 
There was plenty building activity too on private houses. Few houses were 
completely ready; some plots were still empty but in a majority of cases the 
houses were half ready. Often some rooms were complete and people would 
live there, while around them there was the noise and bustle of construction 
labourers, concrete making machines etc. to complete ever more rooms and 
floors. Plenty new construction materials shops had come up in the area; and 
this was in addition to an agency set up by the Commune to sell the 
construction materials with fixed prices as set by the Province.  
But even while these construction issues worried people very much, 
perhaps what was more palpable was a sense of loss, a sense that people 
looked around themselves with some feeling of bewilderment, of alienation: is 
this where we have to live; is this our future place? It must be noted that an 
entire community had been uprooted and that they had been haphazardly – 
without prior planning or taking heed of personal choice - allocated housing 
sites. Hence, people who might have been close neighbours or indeed 
neighbouring families now ended up in different parts of the relocation site. 
We met elderly people who were still in some state of shock after having left 
the houses and gardens with the ancestor graves suddenly and we talked to an 
old woman who was crying when we asked her how she was. This sense of 
alienation, coupled with the absence or work for many men and women led to 
what is called ‘social evils’ in Vietnam:  there was gambling, some men were 
drinking too much, there were quarrels about minor issues which sometimes 
led to fighting.  So employment was a key issue and the greatest worry for 
people. The most severely affected people were former farmers households, 
people who worked on their farmland every day for generations. All the five 
communes affected by the VAEZ were located along the coast, and quite a few 
people were fishermen. But in the resettlement area people had no more 
farmland; the area was located far from the sea and the seaside was to be 
blocked for VAEZ activity (even while we met people who had kept their 
boats, hoping to get out to sea from another spot). Hence, the relocated people 
could neither do farming, nor fishing, and most people had to change to a 
totally different new job. At the time of the survey, most respondents were not 
clear about their job for living in the coming period. Table 6 shows that 90,6 % 
of all respondents worried especially about work prospects. Many local officials 
said that they expected that thousands of jobs would be generated once 
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factories and plants such as the Formosa project become operational at the 
VAEZ. They assumed that local labourers would be first to be employed. 
However, not everybody was so sure. The local farmers generally have neither 
the skills, nor the right attitude to work in industrial plants. They have a low 
education, and most of them are not young and it was perceived to be hard for 
them to be trained for a new job. Consistent perhaps with the entrepreneurial 
and trading spirit of the Vietnamese people, many, many, shops had been 
opened in the new area- almost invariably selling similar products from beer to 
milk to tofu. However, there were so many of these that someone said that ‘all 
potential consumers have their own shop’. Therefore, the problem of large 
unemployment was the most difficult problem for both the local people as well 
as for the administration of various levels of administration in Ha Tinh 
Province. However, there were also contrasting views: one respondent said 
that the relocated people actually had considerable economic and welfare 
benefits; this was their opportunity to escape the hard and difficult agricultural 
work in a terrible climate.  
Whatever the case, when people are unemployed, they have few sources 
for income. Many households relied on their savings or on the compensation 
for day to day living - while mostly investing more or less heavily in new the 
new house. It was already clear that household savings or the compensation 
received would not last long, which is why about 70 % of our respondents 
worried much that sooner or later incomes would fall. We have not explored in 
detail how precisely household were actually using the compensation money 
they had received. After all, for many poor(er) households it was rather a very 
new experience to suddenly own so much cash, and there is evidence from 
other relocation areas that people may not use such funds ‘wisely’ (de Wit, 
2011). There are examples across Vietnam where too much money given to 
children who end up in trouble; that motorbikes and massive flat screen TVs 
are bought, in a sense of consumer competition and ‘showing off to the 
neighbours’. We were only able to ascertain that many households used the 
compensation money to build a new house; others did buy new motorbikes, all 
of which makes perfect sense.  
In a social sense, relocation to the area affected children regarding their 
schooling. There is evidence that the distance from home to school for the 
children from the relocated households in both Ky Phuong and Ky Loi 
communes had increased from about 2 to 5 km. And since children in rural 
areas mainly go to the school on foot, they encounter problems to study. This 
was one reason for concern for about half the respondents. Unemployment 
was also expected to affect the social life of households in new areas including 
the position of women because they might no longer generate (similar) 
incomes as before.    
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Table 8.2  
Concerns of the relocated people 
Concerns N % 
Worry about un(der)-employment 29/32 90,6 
Worry about lower income 22/32 68,8 
Worry about school for children 16/32 50,0 
Other 9/32 28,1 
9  Conclusions: Assessing the implementation of  the 
resettlement policy as a multi-stakeholder and multi-
governance level process 
9.1 Roles and performance of local authorities 
The land acquisition activities and relocation of households in relation to the 
establishment of the Vung Ang Economic Zone were implemented in a 
relatively short time, considering the fact that the whole process was new to all 
levels of Provincial Government; that it entailed a large variety of very specific 
tasks, including the managing of public, private and community stakeholders 
with diverse interests, and finally as it included a large number households to 
be compensated and moved. The Province was led by two main objectives, 
first to clear all lands under agreement with Formosa group in the VAEZ in 
accordance with the plan, and secondly to protect the interests of all affected 
households and communities. As per the land law, conditions in resettlement 
areas must be the same or better than in the old residential areas.  
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Regarding the first objective, land clearance was by and large completed in 
time. Even while there had been a delay in the land clearance by 4 months, this 
had been agreed with the VAEZ and the Formosa Group investors, and the 
latter had not complained. We can consider this a considerable success for the 
authorities of various levels of the Ha Tinh province. The data collected show 
that the province administration mobilized whatever sources needed, including 
human, financial and technical resources in order to clear the land and relocate 
more than 2.000 affected households in a rather short time. By the end of 
August 2010, almost all land required by the project was cleared, and the 
Formosa Group could start construction work. One reason for the relocation 
delay was the delay in completing work in the resettlement areas. 
Regarding the second objective, all affected households had moved to new 
resettlement areas but the infrastructure here was not ready. In both the 
resettlement areas of Ky Loi and Ky Phuong infrastructure construction was in 
full swing at the time of our field work, and it was estimated that the 
construction company would need at least another year to complete its work. 
That only one company – the Xuan Thanh group obtained contracts for as 
many as five resettlement areas for 5 communes may explain much of these 
delays- leading to the problems of relocated people settling in a half-ready, 
incomplete, noisy setting. Seen this way, the Province did not actually comply 
with the legal requirement (Degree No 197-Article 35): ‘Before residential land is 
arranged for households, individuals, comprehensive infrastructure must be built in 
resettlement areas to ensure that users have the same or better conditions compared with their 
old places of residence’. We cannot judge all the factors that led to these delays, for 
example we do not know why only one construction firm was selected for 5 
resettlement areas. The delay might also be related to the capacity of local 
authorities but again we have not studied that in detail. It is generally believed 
that the capacity of officials, especially at the commune level leaves to be 
desired, in terms of human resources: skills, knowledge and attitudes (Fforde, 
2003; De Wit, 2007). This, in turn relates to the general level of literacy and 
nature of education in rural Vietnam, and an apparent lack of (re)training 
possibilities. In terms of the broad capacity framework by Grindle and 
Hildebrand (1995), Commune level capacity is indeed influenced by the 
broader ‘action environment’. But it is important to also consider the nature of 
the institutional context, for example the nature and consistency of the legal 
frameworks guiding compensation and relocation. It is well known that policy 
making in Vietnam may consist of one major resolution or decree, which may 
then be adjusted in a follow up resolution, or amended often soon with a 
decision or some other change. For example, we may refer to the difference 
between successive decrees which stipulated different rates of compensation; 
and to the relatively fast changes between the 1998 and 2003 Grassroots 
Democracy Resolution (Duc/Ngo Huy Duc, 2008:3). Last but not least, the 
nature of leadership, the degree of hierarchy and the organisational culture 
(Grindle et.al. 1995:447) all were shown to impact on the compensation and 
relocation implementation process. Authority relations in Vietnamese public 
sector organisations tend to be relatively hierarchic, leaving less scope for 
lower level officials to be creative, flexible, and enterprising. So it would not be 
a surprise that Commune – but also District level – leaders and officials who 
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were confronted with the ambitious plans surrounding the VAEZ, took some 
time to come to grips with many new types of tasks. There was all round 
mobilisation of staff and resources, and complete loyalty was commanded. So 
when some Commune leaders in Ky Loi sided with the protests of the people, 
they were removed, and there are also reports that key commune officials that 
could not implement the resettlement plan were removed and replaced - at the 
orders from the District or the Province, which were shown to monitor 
developments very closely indeed. We finally tried to keep an open eye as for 
possible incidences of corruption, which are rather frequently reported in 
relation to land recovery, compensation and land resettlement (World Bank, 
2011, World Bank & Swedish/Denmark Embassy, 2011). However, we found 
no references to this from our respondents. One outsider we talked to said 
‘There is corruption on the part of officials, but also by people’, and he 
referred to the case of a household constructing a fishing pond just before the 
relocation to get a benefit. On balance we must conclude that we found it 
difficult to assess the degree of corruption, and this observation applies to 
almost all research into governance in Vietnam. 
9.2 Assessing decentralisation 
The case study of the implementation of the Vung Ang Economic Zone 
project confirms clearly the general perception that there has been 
decentralisation in Vietnam, but that this has stopped at the level of the 
Province (Fritzen, 2002) - where in fact some kind of devolution could be 
discerned in terms of relatively large autonomy of the Ha Tinh Provincial 
People’s Committee. However, devolution or ‘democratic decentralisation’ 
assumes the existence of freely elected politicians who decide about policy and 
budgets, and who steer and control the local officials/ local executive. Such 
democratic control is not strong in Vietnam because the bodies – the People 
Councils – that have the mandate to control the policy makers are very weak, 
their electoral mandate is open to doubt as well as their political 
independence.5 Besides, as was stressed time and again at all levels of 
administration, it is the Party that leads, the Party and People Council decide 
and approve the plan and monitor, and the People Committees implement. We 
may therefore consider the present phase of decentralisation in Vietnam as a 
mix of deconcentration/devolution to the Provincial level, where provinces 
indeed have much more autonomy than in the past (see also Phuong and 
Schroeder, 2010).  Indeed, there are voices warning against too much 
provincial independence and a lack of clear guidance and enforceable rules 
from the Centre in Hanoi, which may lead to increasing inequality across the 
Vietnamese provinces, where rich provinces (or city provinces like Hanoi) may 
themselves take the lead in expanding powers and privileges. Below that level 
the functioning of District and Commune offices can best be seen as examples 
of deconcentration, where policies conceived at higher levels are being 
implemented, and where all plans and budgets need to be approved at higher 
                                                
5 Doc on People councils – PPC members may also be Council members. 
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levels. Generally, each level of administration has to take order from the next 
higher level, and this is based on a) legal documents and decrees etc b) formal 
writings and c) meetings. If there is such a need, in special cases the higher 
level sends leaders to discuss/ monitor issues at the next lower level. The 
establishment of the Vung Ang Management Unit led by the Vice Chairman of 
the Provincial People Committee can be seen as a textbook example of 
‘delegation’ one final form of decentralisation where a centre delegates tasks to 
a specialised agency, while maintaining budgetary and policy control.  
In the case of the VAEZ, the Province over time sent many leaders to the 
Commune to check and support the relocation process- they deal with issues 
when its capacity was seen to be lacking. Such leaders included the very 
powerful Chairman of the CPV at Province level, the Province chairperson of 
the VWU, and Representatives of the Fatherland Front to deal with awareness 
creation, or, as one Commune official had it: ‘the province sends people up 
and down’. However, things may not be so clear-cut; policy making in Vietnam 
is not completely ‘top-down’ with no space for local voices; neither are the 
communes and districts completely powerless: there are intricate webs of 
communication and influence peddling, many decisions rely on personal 
relations and negotiations. One provincial official said when asked about 
capacity at lower levels: ‘it is not about capacity but about relations’… ‘local 
leaders may not have the freedom to influence their neighbours about difficult 
issues. We may have to replace leaders sometimes’. Also, whereas we noted a 
lack of capacity amongst district and commune officials, they also informed us 
that they perceived the VAEZ project as an opportunity to learn and to 
become stronger. One commune leader indicated that there were indeed 
certificate training courses for commune leaders. Finally, the lack of capacity in 
specific areas was often compensated by the dedicated work of the many mass 
organisations, which were shown to have been quite instrumental in plan 
implementation- but ultimately siding more with the state than with the people.  
9.3 Roles and relations of the local officials and mass 
organizations 
In almost all households of the Communes we studied, there is at least one 
member of one of the Vietnamese Mass organisations: 80% of all farmers are 
member of the Farmer Union, numerous women are members of the Women 
Union, the same applies for the Youth Union and last but not least the most 
powerful Fatherland Front (which has the power to select candidates for 
elections of People Councils). One would expect that they would side with 
their constituents, for example support farmers in getting fair compensation 
for land, that the Youth Union would side with the younger folks to demand 
actual job guarantees and so on. However, our findings confirm what has been 
also documented elsewhere (e.g. Kim, 2011) that these mass organisations 
ultimately side with the state, rather than the people. In that way, they cannot 
be characterised as ‘civil society’, as organised citizens interacting constructively 
or critically with the state, but independent of the state. That is not to say that 
they played negative roles, rather that they were equally engaged in supporting 
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people in the complex and sensitive matters of compensation and land 
acquisition/relocation, as well as pressing them to cooperate with Commune, 
District and Vung Ang MU managers on these issues, and not to delay too 
much. That way at least half their work can be captured under the banner of 
‘advocacy’, or persuasion, and it was shown that such persuasion could take 
rather severe forms when people kept on refusing to tow the line. The Mass 
organisations were organised together in the Propaganda Committee, and their 
members (as well as (other) party members, the households of commune 
officials, and village/thon leader households) were expected to lead the way, act 
as a ‘role model’, be first to agree to the inventarisation of land and assets, and 
to be relocated first (which, incidentally, allowed them to occupy they 
largest/most strategic plots in the relocation site). The mass organisations were 
also active as regards other strategies aimed at establishing a an atmosphere of 
cooperation and goodwill in the affected communes, by helping organise a 
festival of land requisition, and to participate in the ‘Harmony Committee’ to pacify 
people who were less enthusiastic to cooperate in the processes of land 
recovery and relocation. There is definitely a very strong and perhaps uniquely 
Vietnamese effort to avoid conflicts, to immediately jump on dissent, to 
maintain harmony as the ideal. 
9.4 Assessing Grassroots democracy 
Considering the mixed evidence of the actual enforcement and value of the 
Grass Roots Democracy (GDR) resolutions (Nho Huy Duc, 2008, 
CECODES/PAPI, 2010) it may be concluded that the local authorities acted 
in line with two of the four key objectives of GDR: the right to be informed 
and to be consulted. There were plenty information meetings, there were many 
consultations – even while many meetings doubled as ‘advocacy’ (persuasion) 
meetings, and people had complete access to all policy makers through 
meetings, household visits and visits to offices. As in most cases of GDR, 
evidence for the most ambitious objectives: ‘people have the right to inspect 
and supervise’ and ‘the right to decide directly’ was not quite clear - but 
assumedly people might not even be aware of these rights which are 
formulated rather broadly (and we did not ask them about it). By and large, one 
might wonder whether people might have had more voice in things like 
planning for their resettlement area (e.g. how much money to be spent on a 
park, school, health post or People Committee Office); in knowing more about 
the resolutions of the People’s Councils as regards compensation and property 
assessment criteria. People of the Communes were not represented directly in 
the various committees (Land Resettlement/ Compensation Committee, 
Harmony Committee, Citizen Monitoring Team, Propaganda Committee, 
Compensation Committee). Of course there is a sense that they are 
represented through mass organisations and Commune People Council, but 
more direct representation might have been quite useful – but perhaps not in 
keeping with administrative culture, which remains top-down. Officials mostly 
felt that they had done a good job as regards Grass Roots democracy: ‘it is a 
very broad decree’; we have practised transparency and accountability about 
the compensation and to obtain consent; and we asked the people opinion’.  
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9.5 Social and economic impacts on the relocated people: 
livelihood changes 
By and large, people were rather adversely affected by the land requisition and 
resettlement process, but we must immediately add that it is too early to draw 
conclusions. After all, our field work took place almost immediately following 
the actual relocation; many people could hardly believe what had happened to 
them, and there was a palpable sense of loss and alienation. Most people were 
dissatisfied, many angry about the fact that the infrastructure was by no means 
ready in their new location of residence. On the other hand, many people were 
suddenly faced with the new sensation of having quite a lot of money by way 
of compensation. We did not study the use of all this money in detail, but 
other studies (cf. de Wit, 2011) indicate that some households invest wisely in 
savings, housing or education for children, others balance a short term expense 
boom with long term investments. Again others may run through the money 
rather quickly by way of buying TVs, motorbikes and consumption items, so 
that a short period of wealth is followed by poverty – perhaps more severe 
than before. So while there are obvious differences in households in terms of 
background, social standing and household strategy, we can make some general 
observations regarding some groups of the population:  
• Perhaps those most affected emotionally were the elderly men and 
women, who suddenly lost their life long familiar and trusted houses, 
gardens, streets and meeting places, now far from their worship 
shrines and ancestor graves, and often also from (most of) their 
children, who might have opted to marry in view of the impending 
relocation, or whose houses were in another part of the relocation site; 
• The many farmers – men and women - similarly felt a massive sense of 
loss: they not only lost their lands but a complete way of life, with all 
the lifelong daily routines with crops and animals and the meetings 
and interactions with other farmers and traders. Even while training 
programs were scheduled for them to be re-trained, general evidence 
of the success of such trainings is limited - if only as farming men and 
women may find it hard to settle in new types of work, and especially 
those older than 45 are known to often fail in getting other jobs (de 
Wit, 2011). The same applies for the people who were fishermen, and 
who now have to wait and see whether that will be possible again later. 
• It is not quite clear what the relocation means for the labourers who 
now live far/further away from their former employers. For those 
who were agricultural labourers the question would be as to whether 
they could still keep working on the farms they used to work, whether 
these farms had disappeared, and whether they could then find other 
farm or other work.  
• For those who were poor (16,2 % of the Ky Phuong people were 
classified as poor before resettlement); there was a view that their 
position had generally improved after the  relocation – if only as they 
also received compensation for their former house and plot, and 
presently own a pretty nice 400m2 site in the resettlement area. 
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• It is likely that women (especially elderly women) were generally 
affected quite adversely. They used to be part time farmers, making 
and selling tofu, many having informal jobs near their former houses. 
Many women had now opened shops but there were so many shops 
that there were hardly any buyers; job prospects for them were rather 
dim indeed.  
• It would appear that younger people might not be always badly 
affected: some of them got lucky and were given more money for 
clothes and motorbikes from the household compensation. Of all 
groups they were most likely to find employment in or around the 
VAEZ, in the industries, the service sector etc. However, some 
parents were worried that the influx of outsiders and foreigners in Ky 
Anh and around VAEZ might lead to an increase of  the dangers of 
‘social evils’ for their children. The area is at the start of a relatively 
dramatic change: an expected influx of both expat workers as well as 
Vietnamese migrants, a general population growth, with divergent 
impacts as in more consumption, building, local taxes and 
employment in entertainment venues. 
• Finally, there were many enterprising men and women who eagerly 
made use of the many new opportunities in and around the 
resettlement area, for example the many building materials shops, 
women becoming engaged in bringing children of other households to 
schools now further away etc.  
This overview shows that impacts are markedly different for different 
groups, and that there were clear shifts in livelihood assets and strategies – 
and in different capitals (Rakodi, 1999; Scott, 2003) over time. For farmers 
and fishing families there was a loss of physical capital in terms of land, 
fishing ponds and sea fishing work. There was a loss or deterioration of 
social capital for probably all households, the entire commune having 
gone through a painful process of adjustment and uprooting, so that 
former close relations, social routines, traditions and informal organisation 
were certainly less strong if not absent now. In terms of human capital, 
lots of people now found their knowledge and skills irrelevant such as 
farmers, women making tofu, unemployed agricultural labourers. They 
were faced with tough choices whether to go for re-training or re-
schooling, or to simply become un-skilled labourer doing any odd job on 
offer, mostly in construction.  
On balance, it is too early to say how things will work out for the Ky 
Phuong people who are now living in the resettlement area following a 
difficult process of land recovery, property assessment, and receiving 
compensation. From a policy perspective, the local authorities have done 
what they could to make the process as effective and as acceptable for the 
people as possible. Further research is needed to assess the long term 
impacts on the various categories of the relocated people, and whether, in 
the longer term, the legal and policy objective was achieved to make the 
new area similar or even better than the former commune.   
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 APPENDICES 
 
Annex 1: Background to Vung Ang Economic Zone 
 
DECISION 
APPROVING THE MASTER PLAN ON CONSTRUCTION OF VUNG 
ANG ECONOMIC ZONE, HA TINH PROVINCE UP TO 2025 
THE PRIME MINISTER 
Pursuant to the Law on Organization of the Government dated December 25, 2001; 
Pursuant to the Construction Law dated November 26, 2003; 
At the proposal of the Ministry of Construction in Document No. 41/TTr-BXD dated July 27, 
2007, and the president of the People’s Committee of Ha Tinh province in Document No. 106/TT-
UBND dated June 19, 2007, 
DECIDES: 
Article 1. To approve the master plan on construction of Vung Ang economic 
zone, Ha Tinh province, up to 2025, with the following principal contents: 
1. Nature 
Vung Ang economic zone of Ha Tinh province has an independent economic 
space, is a muti-purpose economic zone of various sectors, including industries, trade, 
services, tourism, urban centers, agriculture, forestry and fisheries, in which the 
development of metallurgy industry, industries in association with the exploitation of 
seaports, labor-intensive industries and export-processing industries will be promoted. 
2. Scope and boundary 
a) Planning scope and land area 
The zone embraces nine communes of Ky Anh district, Ha Tinh province, 
namely Ky Nam, Ky Phuong, Ky Loi, Ky Long, Ky Lien, Ky Thinh, Ky Trinh, Ky Ha 
and Ky Ninh, covering a land area of 22,781 hectares and bordering on: 
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Annex –II: The Formosa Group 
Taiwan giant to raise capital in Vung Ang EZ 
 
19:56 | 10/08/2010 
 
Taiwan's Formosa Heavy Industry Group plans to raise its investment 
capital in its iron and steel complex and Son Duong deep-water port in 
the Vung Ang Economic Zone to US$23 billion. 
The group said last week it will build its first wharf in 36 months and an iron 
foundry and steel mill within 48 months.  
 
In the first phase, the iron foundry and steel complex will have a combined 
output of 7.5 million tonnes a year, while the deep-water port will be able to 
handle 27-30 million tonnes of cargo. 
The project's first phase has an investment capital of US$8 billion, 95 percent 
of which has come from the Formosa group and the remainder from Sunsco 
Holdings Co. 
In the second phase, the iron and steel plant will lift its capacity to 15 million 
tonnes per year, while the Son Duong deep-water port will have a design dis-
charge capacity of 55-60 million tonnes per year. 
When completed, the iron and steel plant will be the largest in ASEAN and one 
of the 15 largest in the world. 
 
 
